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Promulgated in 1987 by the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) 
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (N.C.C.U.S.L.), Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) is the first comprehensive statutory formulation of per-
sonal property leasing law. In the best · tradition of the 
Restatements and the U.C.C., Article 2A does not create personal 
property leasing law, but rather codifies the better common law 
practices in this rapidly expanding area of commercial law. The 
drafters of Article 2A endeavored to codify the legal treatment of 
personal property leases in much the same way that Articles 2 and 
9 of the U.C.C. preemptively govern sales and secured transactions, 
respectively. While the scope of this new Article is expansive, con-
sistent with its statutory analogue adopted from Article 2,1 the 
1. The drafters of Uniform Article 2A note that: 
The lease is closer in spirit and form to the sale of goods than to the creation of a 
security interest. While parties to a lease are sometimes represented by counsel and 
their agreement is often reduced to a writing, the obligations of the parties are bilat-
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drafters specifically focused upon recurring, and important leasing 
issues.2 
The Lease Article also continues the commercial law's vindica-
tion of freedom of contract principles, assuring that the parties to 
a lease transaction may, for the most part, tailor the lease to the 
exigencies of their particular circumstances. 3 In addition, as with 
other U.C.C. Articles, the design of uniform Article 2A affords the 
states considerable flexibility in tailoring the uniform provisions to 
their existing state laws. For this reason, an understanding of Ala-
bama case law that falls within Article 2A's ambit is crucial to the 
formulation of a proposed version of Article 2A for Alabama. 
Adoption of Article 2A has not been widespread. Currently, 
only nine states have enacted the lease statute. 4 But, support for 
Article 2A is increasing, 5 and eventual adoption by a majority of 
states can reasonably be expected. 6 
eral and'the common law of leasfug is dominated by the need to preserve freedom of 
contract. Thus the drafting committee concluded that Article 2 was the appropriate · 
statutory analogue. 
U.C.C. § 2A-101 comment (1990). [Editor's note: citations to revised Article 2A are identi-
fied at the 1990 edition; citations to former Article 2A and to other Articles of the Uniform 
Commerical Code are identified as the 1989 edition.] 
2. Article 2A is divided into five substantive parts: (1) "General Provisions" (2A-100s); 
(2) "Formation and Construction of Lease Contract" (2A-200s); (3) "Effect of Lease Con-
tract" (2A-300s); (4) "Performance of Lease Contract" (2A-400s); and (5) "Default" (2A-
500s). The new Article speaks to issues such as the formation (see §§ 2A-204 to -206), con-
struction (see § 2A-207) and modification of leases (see § 2A-208); express and implied 
warranties (see §§ 2A-210 to -216); third-party interests and rights under leases (see § 2A~ 
216); priority of leasing interests (see §§ 2A-306 ~ -307); repu~iation, substituted and ex-
cused performance (see §§ 2A-401 to -407); rights and remedies when the lessor or lessee 
defaults (see §§ 2A-508 to -531); statute of frauds (see § 2A-201); and unconscionability (see 
§ 2A-108). ' 
3. U.C.C. § 2A-101 comment (1990). The drafters state that: "This codification was 
greatly influenced by the fundamental tenet of the comn:10n law as it has developed with 
respect to leases of goods: freedom of the parties to contract." Id. 
4. The states which have adopted Article 2A are California, Florida, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, Nevada, Oklahoma,' Oregon, South Dakota and Utah. Telephone interview with John 
McCabe, Legislative Director of-the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (Jan. 6, 1991). · 
5. For a discussion of Article 2A as originally promulgated; see generally Symposium: 
Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 ALA. L. REv., 559 (1988) [hereinafter 
SYMPOSIUM]. . 
6. In addition to the states which have adopted Article 2A it has reportedly been in-
troduced in seven states. It has been estimated that twenty to twenty-five state legislatures 
will propose Article 2A with its 1990 Amendments during 1991. Telephone Interview with 
John McCabe, Legislative Director of the Nati.onal Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws (Jan. 6, 1991). 
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In the Fall of 1988, Robert L. McCurley, Director of the Ala-
bama Law Institute, empaneled a committee of Alabama attorneys 
to consider the desirability of Alabama's enacting a uniform per-
sonal property leasing law. That committee (the "Alabama 
Committee, or "Alabama Article 2A Committee") has worked on a 
draft article since early 1989, and has developed a proposed act 
that vindicates the interest of uniformity and addresses recurring 
issues in a manner consistent with the principles of commercial 
law, as developed in this state. The committee, which met in sev-
eral cities throughout the state, has actively sought the input of 
transactors concerned with personal property leasing law, and their 
counsel. 
Prior to this initiative, commercial law governing personal 
property leasing had never been promulgated. Nevertheless, Ala-
bama courts and transactors have drawn upon several sources of 
law to resolve controversies attending personal property lease 
transactions. The committee took notice of this existing body of 
Alabama law in its consideration of the efficacy of the formulations 
embodied in both the original uniform version of Article 2A 7 and 
the 1990 Uniform Amendments to Article 2A.8 
This Article attempts to facilitate Alabama's consideration of 
Article 2A by exploring Alabama's existing law governing personal 
property leases, and the likely effects of Article 2A on such law. 
After initially examining a case which illustrates how Alabama 
courts have applied Article 2 of the U.C.C., "Sales," as a source of 
law to resolve personal property lease controversies, Part II of this 
endeavor will focus upon the predominant body of law currently 
governing personal property leases in Alabama: namely common-
law "bailment for hire." Part III will then discuss selected provi-
sions of the Alabama draft version of proposed Article 2A. 
II. ALABAMA's PERSONAL PRoPERTY LEASE LAw 
A. Current Basis: Skelton v. Druid City Hospital Board9 
Alabama's current treatment of personal property leasing is 
deficient in two aspects. First, the volume of substantive personal 
7. U.C.C. art. 2A (1989). 
8. U.C.C. art. 2A (1990). 
9. 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984). 
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property lease law in Alabama is minimal. Courts and transacting 
parties have very little law upon which to rely. Unlike the states 
that have adopted Article 2A, 10 Alabama has virtually no statutory 
lease law governing personal property. Moreover, a court that faces 
a personal property lease issue will find relatively few Alabama 
cases dealing with personal property lease transactions.11 Except 
for those very few issues that have been litigated, most personal 
property leasing questions remain unanswered in Alabama. 
Second, the case law that does exist, for the most part, is inad-
equate. Alabama courts have primari~y relied upon the common 
law of "bailment for hire" when dealing with personal property 
''lease"12 issues.13 The common law term, "bailment for hire," can 
be defined as a mutually beneficial transaction14 that involves the 
hiring or letting of property to one party, the bailee, who takes the 
property into his care and custody, and thereafter permits the 
bailee's temporary use and possession of it.15 The courts' applica-
tion of common law bailment principles is appropriate because a 
common law personal property lease is, by definition, a bailment 
for hire.16 
Nevertheless, bailment law has sometimes proven inadequate 
in resolving conflicts in modern lease transactions.17 Thus, in ad-
dressing this lack of authority, Alabama courts have occasionally 
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
11. Farmer v. Machine Craft, 406 So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) ("The law in 
Alabama concerning bailments is exceedingly sparse."). 
12. Hendon v. McCoy, 222 Ala. 515, 517, 133 So. 295, 296-97 (1931) ("The word 'lease' 
is generally used with particular reference to real estate, resulting in the relation of landlord 
and tenant. ..• But, when applied to personal property, it properly results in the relation of 
bailor and bailee.") (citation omitted). 
13. See Learned-Letcher Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 109 Ala. 169, 19 So. 396 (1896) (court 
applied bailment law in determining duration of agreement where plaintiff agreed to pay per 
diem rate for the use of defendant's oxen). · 
14. Aircraft Sales & Serv. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 511, 52 So. 2d 388, 391 ·(1951); see 
also Heughan v. State, 82 Ga. App. 640, 645, 61 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1950) ("A bailment for hire 
is a bailment for the mutual benefit of both parties."). 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 80-92. 
16. See U.C.C. § 2A-103 comment (j) (1990); see also Boss, Leases and Sales: Ne'er or 
Where Shall the Twain Meet?, 1983 Aim. ST. L.J. 357, 364, nn.31-32 ("[T]he term lease has 
become synonomous [sic] with the common law transaction called the 'bailment for 
hire' ...• "). 
17. See Boss, Lease Chattel Paper: Unitary Treatment of a "Special" Kind of Com-
mercial Specialty, 1983 DuKE L.J. 69, 73 (noting "the lack of refinement in the old common 
law [of bailmentJU). 
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relied upon the law of real estate,18 the law of contracts,19 and di-
rect20 and analogous21 applications of Articles 2 and 9 of the 
18. The drafters of Article 2A noted this practice of borrowing from the law of real 
estate. See U.C.C. art. 2A foreword (1989) ("[U]nder present law, ... [personal property 
transactions] are governed ... partly by principles relating to real estate leases .... "). 
Accord Aerowake Aviation v. Winter, 423 So. 2d 165, 166-67 (Ala. 1982) ("The dispute at 
trial [court level] and on appeal concerns the nature of the parties' arrangements ... 
whether it was a bailment or merely a lease or license. If a bailment, [defendant] owe[s] a 
duty as bailee to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for the protection of the [property]. 
If it [is] a lease or license, there would be no such duty .... "). 
Nevertheless, the more reasoned approach clearly rejects the application of real prop-
erty principles to personal property transactions. The Supreme Court of Alabama has more 
recently stated that: "[W]e reaffirm the rule that an action for conversion will not lie for the 
taking of real property." Faith, Hope & Love, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank of Talladega County 
N.A., 496 So. 2d 708, 711 (Ala. 1986). In other words, 
[S]ince we necessarily are concerned with personal, rather than real, property a lease 
is nothing more than a written agreement creating a common-law bailment for hire 
for the mutual benefit of the parties, the bailor to receive the consideration for use of 
the bailed property, and the bailee to receive the benefit of the use of the bailed 
property during the term of the bailment. In more modern usage, long-term bail-
menta for hire are usually referred to as leases, but this does not preclude application 
of the common-law principles of bailment. 
Buel Stone Corp. v. Buckeye Aeration Serv., No. 84AP-440 (Ohio App. January 31, 1985) 
(WL 9837 at 5) (unpublished opinion). 
At common law, "[r]eal estate [could] not be the subject of a bailment." W. ELLIOTT, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS§ 6, at 11 (W. Hemingway 2d ed. 1929). 
Perhaps this is why some scholars have criticized the application of real estate principles to 
modern lease transactions. See, e.g., Boss, supra note 16, at 369 n.54 (suggesting that only 
analogies to real estate law should be used but not in toto application). 
19. See Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water Works, 292 Ala. 147, 290 So. 2d 636 
(1974); Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 303-04, 13 So. 2d 172, 174 (1943); Ex parte Mobile 
Light & R.R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924); see also, e.g., Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. 
Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 821 (Ala. 1984) ("[O]ur legislature intended that [Ala. Code] § 7-2-315 
[dealing with implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose] be broadly interpreted to 
include transactions in which there is no actual transfer of title, such as rental and lease 
transactions."); DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (when 
transaction was determined to be lease and not sale, court applied common law and the law 
of contracts rather than the U.C.C.), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975). 
20. See Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984) (applying ALA. 
ConE§ 7-2-313 to lease transactions); accord Baugh v. Bradford, 529 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1988). 
See generally Note, Bailor Beware: Limitations and Exclusions of Liability in Commercial 
Bailments, 41 VAND. L. REV. 129, 155-68 (1988) (discussion of the application of Article 2 to 
bailment transactions). 
21. See, e.g., Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, 540 So. 2d 713 (Ala. 1989) (applying 
standard in section 2-302 of the U.C.C., governing unconscionability of contracts, by analogy 
to lease agreements); Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Ala., 453 So. 2d 735, 741 (Ala. 1984) (The 
court, in refusing to give effect to an exculpatory clause of a residential lease contract, 
stated that: "[W]e think it reasonable for this court to apply [ALA. ConE] § 7-2-302 [dealing 
with unconscionable contract clauses] by analogy to lease agreements.") (citing Weaver v. 
American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 464, 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1971) ("The analogy is ra-
1990] Alabama Lea·se Law 107 
U.C.C.22 As a result, Alabama law governing personal property 
leases represents a patchwork of principles that have been articu-
lated by various courts over the past century; to the detriment of 
leasing parties, much of the available case law lacks continuity and 
clarity. 
The need to clarify personal prpperty lease law in Alabama is 
perhaps best illustrated by the current analysis and treatment of 
so-called "hybrid transactions"-those involving both goods and 
services. 23 Courts have typically treated a hybrid transaction ac-
cording to its predominant characteristic. 24 For example, a 
transaction that involves both the sale and administration of 
tiona!.")); Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics, 125 Misc. 2d 68, 478 N.Y.S.2d 505 
(1984). But see DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 153-54 (N.D. Ala. 1974) 
(U.C.C. held not to apply to transaction determined to be lease and not a sale), aff'd, 511 
F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975). 
22. See generally Boss, Panacea or Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B.UL. REv. 39, 
42-45 (1984) (discussing "[t]he theoretical argument for including leases withing [sic] the 
ambit of Article 2." Id. at 42); Note, Disengaging Sales Law From the Sale Construct: A 
Proposal to Extend the Scope of Article 2 of the U.C.C, 96 HARv. L: REv. 470 (1982). But 
see DeKalb Agresearch, 391 F. Supp. at 153-54 ("As this contract is a lease, it is not covered 
by the Uniform Commercial Code, and is, therefore, dependent upon the common law and 
the law of contracts for its construction and effect.") (footnotes omitted); Coakley & Wil-
liams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 778 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying 
Maryland law, the court found plaintiff to be a buyer of services, rather than goods; there-
fore, the Maryland version of U.C.C. Article 2 extended no warranty rights to a purchaser of 
services), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986). 
23. See discussion infra note 34. 
24. See Skelton v. Druid City Hasp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 822 (Ala. 1984) (citing Berry 
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 ill. 2d 54, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974)); Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. 
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 778 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986). 
The "predominant purpose" test is the majority rule~ J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, UNIFORM 
CoMMERCIAL CoDE§ 1-1 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter WHITE & SuMMERS] (citing Bonebrake v. 
Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974) and De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975)). By contrast, under the minority rule, Article 2 would 
apply only to the "sale of goods". aspects of the transaction. WHITE & SUMMERS § 1-1 (citing 
the leading case of Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (lOth Cir. 1967)). 
Professors White and Summers note that the "predominant purpose" test presupposes 
that Article 2 should or should not be applied to the transaction as a whole, rather than 
subjecting a single transaction to different bodies of law as under the minority rule. How-
ever, these commentators advocate the adoption of a more flexible rule, rather than strictly 
adhering to the predominant puq)ose test. They suggest that the better approach is to allow 
application of "two bodies of law-one to the goods aspect and one to the non-goods aspect . 
• . , [as long as this would not present] 'insurmountable problems of proof in segregating 
assets and determining their respective values at the time of the original contract and at the 
time of resale, in order to apply two different measures of damages.' " WHITE & SuMMERS § 
1-1, at 26 (quoting Hudson v. Town & Country True Value Hardware, 666 S.W.2d 51, 54 
(Tenn. 1984)). 
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drugs, as well as one that involves the sale and installation of win-
dows, would fall entirely within the scope of Article 2 if the 
predominant nature of the transaction is deemed a sale of goods. 2~ 
Similarly, in the absence of statutory lease law such as Article 2A, 
Alabama courts might interpret a lease contract involving a hybrid 
transaction by applying the provisions of the U.C.C. Article on 
Sales, Article 2. 
This was the case in Skelton v. Druid City Hospital Board, 26 
where the plaintiff sued the manufacturer, distributor, salesperson 
and administering hospital for damages suffered when a suturing 
needle broke off in the plaintiff's body during a hernia operation.27 
The plaintiff, relying on section 7-2-315 of the Alabama Code,28 as 
well as supplementation by common law,29 claimed that the de-
fendants impliedly warranted that the needle was fit for its 
intended purpose when "sold" to plaintiff. The trial court granted 
partial summary judgment for defendant Druid City Hospital on 
the grounds that the transaction was not a "sale" under the mean-
ing of section 7-2-315, and that the hospital was not a merchant of 
goods but a provider of services. Consequently, the trial court held 
that there could be no implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose. 5° 
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, rejecting defend-
ant's characterization of the transaction as wholly consisting of a 
"service," and instead, determined that the hospital's repeated use 
of a defective suturing needle was "more akin to a lease or rental 
of equipment than a sale."31 The Skelton court concluded that the 
Alabama legislature "intended that § 7-2-315 be broadly inter-
25. Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 822 (Ala. 1984); see also discus-
sion supra note 24. 
26. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 822. 
27. ld. at 819. 
28. Section 7-2-315 of the Alabama Code states that: 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular 
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's 
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modi-
fied under section 7-2-316 an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such 
purpose. 
ALA. ConE § 7-2-315 (1984). 
29. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 820. 
30. Id. 
31. Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 821 (Ala. 1984) (emphasis in 
original). 
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preted to include transactions . . . such as rent'al and lease 
transactions."32 The court reasoned that the transaction was, in 
fact, a "hybrid" since it involved "both a· service transaction and a 
'transaction in goods.' "33 
The Skelton court's application of commercial sales principles 
to a lease transaction illustrates the problematic state of personal 
property lease law in Alabama. Skelton provides some authority 
for the application of Article 2 (especially the warranty provisions), 
either directly or by analogy, to lease transactions.34 In the absence 
32. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 821; Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 lli. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 
550 (1974). But see Board of Educ. v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 lli. 2d 428, 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989) 
(holding that Article 2 did not extend to leases on grounds of privity and notice). 
33. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 821 (emphasis in original). 
34. The case also affects the analysis of hybrid transactions: 
In light of the statement in the Official Comment to section 7-2-313, that the 
warranty sections of Article 2 "need not be confined to sales contracts," we opine our 
legislature intended that § 7-2-315 be broadly interpreted to include transactions in 
which there is no actual transfer of title, such as rental and lease transactions. 
Skelton, 459 So, 2d at 821- (emphasis in original). Skelton stands for the proposition that a 
"lease" transaction involving the rendition of services may be subject to the pervasive lease 
law, including Article 2A once adopted. 
. . In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Torbert offers sensible guidance for the hybrid 
transaction issues that will remain under Articles 2 and 2A. Applying principles set forth in 
Caldwell v. Brown Serv. Funeral Home, 345 So. 2d 1341 (Ala. 1977), Chief Justice Torbert 
suggests that, in hybrid transaction cases, courts ought to focus on the predominant element 
of a transaction in determining whether the case should be treated as a "goods" or "ser-
vices" transaction. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 824 (Torbert, C.J., specially concurring). In 
Caldwell, the plaintiffs had entered into an agreement with a funeral home by which de-
fendant was to provide plaintiff with graveside services, a casket, and a vault following the 
death of their son. As in Skelton, plaintiff sought from defendant both services and goods 
necessary for the rendition of those services. Because the vault was found to be too small for 
the casket, graveside services had to be conducted a second time. Plaintiffs sued the funeral 
home for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. The Supreme 
Court of Alabama found an implied warranty to exist even though the transaction was 
clearly of a hybrid nature. See Caldwell, 345 So. 2d at 1342-43. The court's treatment of 
such "hybrid" transactions is not unique. The Skelton court cited several cases as authority: 
Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 lli. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974) (implied warranty found 
where transaction involved distribution of birth control pills to plaintiff); Mauran v. Mary 
Fletcher Hosp., 318 F. Supp. 297, 301 (D. Vt. 1970) (court construing Vermont law noted 
that "the trend of decisions in Vermont and elsewhere indicates that the Supreme Court of 
Vermont might very possibly recognize" implied warranties where transaction involved the 
inadvertent administration of insulin rather than "preoperative medicine"); Newmark v. 
Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (implied warranty found where transaction 
involved administration of permanent wave solution to plaintiff's hair). 
According to Chief Justice Torbert the central issue is: 
[N]ot whether mixed or hybrid agreements [such as in Skelton and Caldwell] give 
rise to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) implied warranties, but rather how 
agreements involving both a transaction in goods and a rendering of services are to be 
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of statutory lease law, Skelton is presumably a source of lease law 
in Alabama. 
The problem, however, is the resulting imperfect fit between 
Article 2 and lease transactions. Article 2, unlike proposed Article 
2A, was not designed to meet the exigencies attending personal 
property leases. Alabama's proposed Article 2A has been designed 
as the mechanism by which Alabama can preemptively and com-
prehensively deal with an expanding area of commercial activity by 
incorporating the best aspects of Alabama common law. Of course 
classified so that it may then be detel'D:lined whether the U.C.C. implied warranties 
apply. 
Skelton, !159 So. 2d at 824 (Torbert, C.J., specially concurring). Chief Justice Torbert cited 
for support Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974), in which the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals applied the same predominant factor analysis and concluded that a con-
tract to supply and install bowling equipment was a transaction in goods even where the 
performance of services was substantial. Thus, "the U.C.C. was held to be applicable." Skel-
ton, 459 So. 2d at 824. 
The determination of Articles 2 and 2A issues in the context of hybrid transactions 
would, under this approach, hinge on the predominant characteristics of the agreement. 
Where the transaction primarily involves a service with a lease of goods incidentally in-
volved, the U.C.C. is less likely to be applicable. See Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 824-25 (Torbert, 
C.J., specially concurring) (citing Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974)). Chief 
Justice Torbert cited two cases as examples: Pitler v. Michael Reese Hosp., 92 lll. App. 3d 
739, 415 N.E.2d 1255 (1980) (transaction involving radiation treatments deemed to involve 
primarily services even though equipment was involved) and Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie 
Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442 (D.S.C. 1977) (transaction involving installation of resilient 
flooring deemed to involve primarily services). But where the transaction is predominantly a 
sale (or lease), with labor incidentally involved, the U.C.C. is more likely applicable. See 
Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 824-25 (Torbert, C.J., specially concurring) (citing Coakley & Wil-
liams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1983) (contract to install 
windows held to be predominantly sale of goods) and Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th 
Cir. 1974) (contract to supply and install bowling equipment held to be predominantly a 
transaction in goods)). 
It is not uncommon for a transaction to fall within the purviews of both Article 2 and 
one or more other statutes. WHITE & SuMMERS, supra note 24, § 1-1, at 24. Such transac-
tions generally give rise to scope issues that fall into one of two categories: (1) cases where 
goods are not involved at all, or cases which involve goods but where the transaction is not a 
sale (such as a lease); and (2) hybrid cases where the transaction involves both goods and 
services. WHITE & SuMMERS, supra note 24, § 1-1, at 25. See supra notes 23-33 and accom-
panying text regarding hybrid transactions. 
Codification of Article 2A will not eliminate issues involving hybrid lease transactions. 
Even if Alabama's proposed Article 2A is adopted, it is still inevitable that Alabama courts 
will face hybrid transactions that concurrently fall under both Article 2 and Article 2A. 
Thus, the hybrid transaction analyses, discussed supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text, 
will remain relevant as to whether courts apply either Article 2 or Article 2A, or both, and 
the common law of bailments, to the entire transaction. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 
24, § 1-1, at 26. 
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if Article 2A is adopted, Skelton's holding that Article 2 should be 
applied to leasing issues would become moot. 
In addition to considering Skelton's impact, a proposal of Ar-
ticle 2A in Alabama would be incomplete without further 
examination of the existing lease law, the common law of bail-
ments. The Alabama bailment cases that exist deal mainly with ·a 
bailee's obligations within the bailment relationship, sG as weii as 
his ,duty to care for the bailed personal property.36 While these 
bailment cases reflect only one aspect of a lease transaction, they 
do comprise most of Alabama's existing personal property lease 
law and are, therefore, pertinent to the proposal of an Article 2A 
that is tailored for Alabama. 
B. Historical Basis: Development of the Law of Bailments 
1. The Importance of Historical Analysis.-An understand-
ing of the common law of bailments is a prerequisite to the proper 
application of modern leasing principles. Assume, for example, 
that two individuals, "A" and "B," wish to enter into an agreement 
in which A retains legal title to a certain automobile while posses-
sion is temporarily transferred to B. Both A and B agree that the 
transaction is to be accomplished according to any one of the fol-
lowing seven hypotheticals: (1) A pledges the car as security for a 
debt that he owes to B, and B is vested with the right to sell the 
car in the event of default; (2) A agrees to let B use the vehicle one 
weekend, yet A receives no corresponding benefit or compensation; 
(3) after paying B a fee, A parks his own car in B's parking lot, 
taking his keys with him; ( 4) while at a restaurant A allows B, for a 
fee, to valet-park the vehicle, after which B maintains possession 
and, consequently, control over the vehicle; (5) A allows B to valet-
park A's car, and thereafter, A's car keys are returned to him; (6) A 
pays B a monthly fee in exchange for the use of a particular park-
ing space; or (7) B pays A a monthly fee and, in exchange, B 
receives A's permission to possess and use the vehicle under cer-
tain terms. 
In each of these agreements, issues involving contract forma-
tion and construction, warranties, and the rights and concomitant 
35. See infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text. , . 
36. See infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text. 
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duties of A and Bare not only dependent upon the attendant con-
tractual terms, but also upon the common law characterization of 
the transaction. 37 Common law bailments such as the "pawn" and 
"loan," examples (1) and (2),38 can easily be confused with other 
transactions such as the lease of real property found in example 
(6).39 Even though the historical development of modern leasing 
principles is deeply rooted in the common law bailment transac-
tion, some types of bailments, such as those in examples (1) and 
(2), are not predecessors of modern personal property leases, as 
contrasted with example (7), which is such a predecessor.40 
Whether a court or an attorney chooses to characterize a par-
ticular agreement as a bailment or as some other type of 
transaction may be both the threshold and the dispositive issue in 
the case.41 Also, whether a judge or an attorney can distinguish be-
tween the various kinds of bailments may determine the outcome 
of an action. Since a lease of personal property is a derivative of 
the "bailment for hire," an analysis of Article 2A's effect on Ala-
bama should consider the state's bailment cases. 
When reviewing Alabama's common law, a two-tier analysis 
may facilitate an understanding of Article 2A's application to a 
particular transaction. First, one must decide whether a bailment 
is involved as opposed to some other type of transaction. Second, if 
37. However, the drafters have made clear their intent to maintain Article 2A's flexi-
ble application: 
A court may apply this Article by analogy to any transaction, regardless of form, 
that creates a lease of personal property other than goods, taking into account the 
expressed intentions of the parties to the transaction and any differences between a 
lease of goods and a lease of other property. Such application has precedent as the 
provisions of the Article on Sales (Article 2) have been applied by analogy to leases of 
goods. . . . Whether such application would be appropriate for other bailments of 
personal property, gratuitous or for hire, should be determined by the facts of each 
case. 
Further, parties to a transaction creating a lease of personal property other than 
goods, or a bailment of personal property may provide by agreement that this Article 
applies. Upholding the parties' choice is consistent with the spirit of this Article. 
ALA. U.C.C.- LEASES § 7-2A-102 comment (Ala. L. Inst. Official Working Draft 1990) [here-
inafter DRAFT ALA. ConE] (citations omitted) (adopted verbatim from Uniform Article 2A). 
38. See infra note 44 regarding Roman classifications of bailments. 
39. See, e.g., Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. 181, 298 So. 2d 266 
(1974); see infra text accompanying notes 58-72. 
40. Personal property leases can only be traced to one type of bailment-the bailment 
for hire. See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text. 
41. See infra text accompanying notes 55-80, distinguishing bailments from other sim-
ilar transactions such as a real property lease or license. 
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the transaction is a bailment, one must decide whether it is a 
"bailment for hire" (that is, a personal property lease) or some 
other type of bailment. 
2. Origin and Adoption.-The legal doctrines governing bail-
ments42 have descended to Alabama primarily from the English 
case of Coggs v. Bernard,43 in which the court adopted the Roman 
system of classifying bailments. 44 The common law definition of a 
bailment was adopted by Alabama in Farmer v. Machine Craft. 415 
In Farmer, the plaintiff filed suit against his employer to recover 
42. The bailment transaction has been subject to various definitions over the years •. 
See, e.g., W. ELLI01T, supra note 18, § 1; J. STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAIL-
MENTS § 2 (6th ed. 1856). The term "bailment" derives from the French word, "bailler," 
which means "to deliver." J . STORY§ 2, at 1. Justice Story defined a bailment generally as "a 
delivery of a thing m trust for some special object or purpose, and upon a contract, ex-
pressed or implied, tO conform to the object or purpose of the trust." J. STORY § 2, at 3. 
Alabama adopted a slightly different definition of a bailment in Farmer v. Machine 
Craft, 406 So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (" 'delivery of personal property by one 
person to another in trust for a specific purpose, with a contract, express or implied, that 
the trust shall be faithfully executed, and the property returned or duly accounted for when 
the special purpose is accomplished, or kept until the bailor reclaims it.' "). (quoting 8 AM. 
JUR. 2D Bailments § 2 (1980)). At common law "[t]he subject-matter of a bailment is always 
personal property." W. ELLI01T, supra note 18, § 6, at 11. 
Article 2A states that "[a]t common law a lease of personal property is a bailment for 
hire. While there are several definitions of bailment for hire, all require a thing to be let and 
a price for the letting." U.C.C. § 2A-103 comment (j) (1990). 
43. 2 Ld. Raymond 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703). See generally W. ELLI01T, 
supra note 18, § 3, at 5-6; Boss, supra note 22, at 100 n.292 ("Coggs stands for the proposi-
tion, inter alia, that a bailee is not an insurer absolutely liable for damage to the bailed 
property, but he is responsible for his negligent acts.")(citing R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PER· 
SONAL PROPERTY § 11.1, at 252-53 (3d ed. 1975)). 
44. The six classes of bailments under Roman law were: (1) Depositum (deposit)-a 
bailment merely for custody without compensation; (2) Mandatum (mandate)-a bailment 
where the bailee performs some service without compensation; (3) Commodatum (gratuitous 
loan)-a gratuitous bailment of goods for bailee's use; (4) Mutuum (loan of chattels)-a 
bailment where the original goods are not delivered back to the bailor but are replaced 
instead by similar goods. The transaction is not considered a true bailment at common law 
but rather is a sale or exchange; (5) Pignus (pawn or pledge)-a bailment where goods are 
pledged or pawned as a security for a debt and the bailee may sell the goods in the event of 
default; (6) locatio (hiring)-a bailment for reward or a hiring. This last category was fur-
ther divided into locatio rei, concerning the hired use of a thing, and locatio operis, 
concerning the hired services of a thing. A locatio-operis was even further characterized into 
three subparts. W. ELLI01T, supra note 18, § 4, at 8. These classifications have been criti-
cized as "crude." J. ScHOULER, THE LAw OF BAILMENTS INCLUDING PLEDGE, INNKEEPERS, AND 
CARRIERS § 5, at 4 n.1 (1905). See also R. BROWN, supra note 43, § 10.1; W. ELLI01T, supra 
note 18, §§ 3, 4. 
The concept of bailments was codified as early as the Code of Hammurabi and the 
Mosaic Law. W. ELL101T, supra note 18, § 3, at 5 n.6. 
45. 406 So. 2d 981 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981). 
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for losses resulting from the theft of a toolbox that plaintiff volun-
tarily left at work.46 The plaintiff was required by the defendant to 
supply his own tools. Employees were allowed to leave their tools 
at work overnight, even though the defendant knew that its secur-
ity system was inoperative. Although some employees were aware 
that the system did not work, and chose to take their tools home at 
night, the plaintiff opted to leave his tools. The defendant's build-
ing was burglarized and plaintiff's property was stolen. Plaintiff 
brought suit on a bailment theory, alleging that the defendant had 
neglected to maintain its alarm system and, therefore, had failed to 
exercise ordinary care in securing the bailed personal property.47 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. On 
appeal, the court reasoned that the case turned on whether, as a 
matter of law, a bailment existed between plaintiff and defend-
ant.48 The court held that the elements of a bailment include: 1) 
actual or constructive change of possession;49 2) voluntary assump-
tion of custody and possession of the property;~0 3) actual or 
constructive change in control over the item; and 4) the bailee's 
intentional exercise of control. ~1 
In spite of defendant's occasional possession of the property, 
the court held that no bailment was created because no change in 
46. Farmer, 406 So. 2d at 982. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. See also, e.g., Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. 181, 185, 298 
So. 2d 266, 269 (1974) (bailment to park car for owner was terminated when parking attend-
ant relinquished possession and control of vehicle by returning keys to owner); Kravitz v. 
Parking Serv. Co., 240 Ala. 467, 467, 199 So. 731, 732 (1940) (bailee's "duties of reasonable 
care spring out of his possession"); Ridgely Operating Co. v. White, 227 Ala. 459, 462, 150 
So. 693, 695 (1933) ("such possession may be constructive, growing out of the relation of the 
parties"). 
50. Farmer v. Machine Craft, 406 So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981). See also Kra-
vitz v. Parking Serv. Co., 240 Ala. 467, 467, 199 So. 731, 732 (1940) ("An essential element of 
bailment is possession in the bailee."); Ridgely Operating Co. v. White, 227 Ala. 459, 462, 
150 So. 693, 695 (1933) ("It is undoubtedly true that a bailee must have possession of the 
property."). 
51. Farmer, 406 So. 2d at 983 (citing 8 AM. JuR. 2D Bailments § 66 (1980)). See, e.g., 
Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. 181, 185, 298 So. 2d 266, 269 (1974) (no 
bailment found at time when car was stolen where plaintiff left car at defendant's parking 
lot and took keys with him); Ex parte Mobile Light & R.R., 211 Ala. 525, 527, 101 So. 177, 
178 (1924) (no bailment found where car owner paid to park car in defendant's lot); see also 
Ho Bros. Restaurant v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 492 So. 2d 603, 605 (Ala. 1986) (court 
distinguished bailment from meaning of "entrustment" used within exculpatory clause of 
insurance contract). 
1990] Alabama Lease Law~ 115 
control took place.IS2 The Farmer court concluded that, in the ab-
sence of a bailment, the defendant had no duty to protect the 
property.ISs Thus, a bailment transaction under Alabama common 
law is found only where one party voluntarily and intentionally as-
sumes possession and control, either actual or _constructive, of 
personal property on behalf of, or in trust for, another.IS4 Clearly, _a -
personal property lease would constitute such a bailment. 
3. Distinguishing the Common Law of Bailments.-_A mod-
ern lease transaction can be more clearly understood when the 
bailment is distinguished from similar. transactions such as a li-
cense, ISIS sale, IS6 or real property lease.67 Drawing a bright line,. 
however, has sometimes proved to be a problematic task for Ala-
bama courts, and which in turn has contributed to the conf~sion 
regarding personal pr()perty lease principles in Alabama. 
The case of Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson1S8 offers just 
such an example.- Plaintiff turned his car over to·a parking attend-
ant at defendant's parking lot.IS9 The attendant parked the vehicle, _ 
locked it, and then returned the key~ to plaintiff. 60 The plaintiff 
alleged that the attendant assured him that the lot was a "24-hour 
lot," although a sign stated that the lot was monitored only from 
6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. 61 Plaintiff, intending his son to pi_ck up the . 
car later, left money in the trimk so his son could pay any addi-
tional parking fees.62 The attendant, not wanting to be responsible 
for the money left in the trunk, directed plaintiff to leave the keys 
at the bus station across the street.63 Later, the vehicle was stolen 
from the parking lot and the plaintiff sued, claiming that a bail-
ment existed and that defendant had converted the car.64 
The transaction in Lawson is similar to that of ·a bailment. · 
The defendant had taken temporary possession of· th~ person8.I 
52. Farmer, 406 So. 2d at 983. 
53. Id. 
J 54. Id. at 982-83. 
55. See infra notes 58-72 & 79 and accompanying text; see also supra note 41. 
56. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text; see also supra note 41. 
57. See infra notes 58-72 & 79 and accompanying text. 
58. , 53 Ala. App. 181, 298 So. 2d 266 (1974} . 
. 59. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. at 183, 298 So. 2d at 267. 
·60. Id. 
61. Id . 
. 62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. at 183, 298 So. 2d at 267. 
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property on plaintiff's behalf. Nevertheless, the court found that 
no bailment existed. siS In determining what duty of care was owed 
by the attendant, the court analyzed similar cases and attempted 
to clarify the differences between a bailment, a license, and a lease 
(here, a lease of real, not personal, property-namely, plaintiff's 
lease of a space in the parking lot).66 
The court determined that a bailment would exist only where 
automobile owners leave their keys with attendants who volunta-
rily assume custody and control over the cars. 67 If, however, the 
owner only gives permission to the attendant to park the car in a 
convenient place but does not give him dominion or custody of the 
vehicle, the transaction is a license. 68 In addition, the court noted 
that a lease is formed where a specific parking space is assigned to 
the owner for his exclusive use. 69 
The Lawson court concluded that the defendant did not have 
custody or control of the vehicle, as is necessary in the case of a 
true bailment and, therefore, was not liable for the theft. 70 After 
the attendant parked the car and relinquished possession to the 
65. Id. at 185, 298 So. 2d at 269. 
66. Id. at 184, 298 So. 2d at 268. 
67. Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. 181, 184, 298 So. 2d 266, 267 
(1974) (citing Lewis v. Ebersole, 244 Ala. 200, 203-04, 12 So. 2d 543, 544 (1943)). 
68. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. at 184, 298 So. 2d at 268 (license is distinct from a bailment 
or a lease). The Supreme Court of Alabama has stated that: 
A lease is a contract for the possession and profit of land by the lessee, and a recom-
pense ... to the lessor, ... [while a] license is an authority to do some act or series of 
acts on the land of another, for the benefit of the licensee, without passing any estate 
in the land .... 
Holt v. City of Montgomery, 212 Ala. 235, 237, 102 So. 49, 50 (1924) (quoting Stinson v. 
Hardy, 27 Or. 584, 41 P. 116, 118 (1895)), quoted in Mason v. Carroll, 289 Ala. 610, 612, 269 
So. 2d 879, 880 (1972). See also Steward v. St. Regis Paper Co., 484 F. Supp. 992, 995 (S.D. 
~a. 1979) ("A lease conveys an interest in realty, while a license conveys only the right to 
do some act or acts on the land of another, which is an interest in personalty and does not 
pass any estate in the land.")(citing Holt, 212 Ala. at 237, 102 So. at 50). Under this test a 
lease is presumed if the contract " 'gives exclusive possession of the premises against all 
the world, including the owner.'" I d. (emphasis in original) (quoting Holt v. City of Mont-
gomery, 212 Ala. 235, 237, 102 So. 49, 50-51 (1924)); Brown v. Five Points Parking Center, 
121 Ga. App. 819, 175 S.E.2d 901 (1970) (holding that an agreement between plaintiff (car 
owner) and defendant ("lock and park" garage owner) was a license rather than a bailment 
where such was stated on parking ticket that plaintiff signed). 
69. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. at 185, 298 So. 2d at 268 (where parking attendant merely 
directs the owner as to where to park, and the owner retains the keys, there has been no 
bailment, merely a license on the use of realty) (citing Lewis v. Ebersole, 244 Ala. 200, 203-
04, 12 So. 2d 543, 544 (1943)). 
70. Id. at 185, 298 So. 2d at 269. 
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owner by returning the keys, the defendant became a lessor of a 
parking space rather than a bailee of the vehicle.'71 Depending on 
the particular facts, a relatively simple and common act such as 
leaving a car at a parking lot or with a valet can be characterized 
as one of several different forms of transactions. The Lawson court 
confused the issue further by using _the term "lease" rather than 
the term "bailment."72 Regrettably, the court did not clarify that 
the lease in this case was one of real, rather than personal, 
property. 
In another case, DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott,'73 the court ad-
dressed the threshold issue of whether a transaction was a sale or a 
personal property lease (a common law bailment for hire).' The 
court's distinction between these two transactions determined 
what law was to be applied-common law of "bailments for hire" 
or Article 2 of the U.C.C. In DeKalb, the plaintiff contracted to 
lease hens and eggs to defendant for breeding.'74 Plaintiff retained 
title to the hens and eggs, and defendant agreed not to sell or dis-
pose of them without the plaintiff's consent. 76 Plaintiff moved for 
summary judgment on defendant's counterclaim that alleged 
breach of various express and implied warranties. '76 The court con-
cluded that, based on the contract terms, the arrangement was in 
fact a lease and not a sale.'77 So the common law of both bailments 
and contracts was applied. '7s 
As Lawson and DeKalb illustrate, courts struggle with trans-
actions that might more appropriately be handled as personal 
property leases under Article 2A.'79 A transaction may simultane-
ously resemble a common law bailment, a license, and a real 
property lease as in Lawson; or a lease may resemble a sale as in 
DeKalb. Interestingly, Article 2A would govern cases such as 
DeKalb where a personal property lease is found; and of course, if 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975). 
74. DeKalb, 391 F. Supp. at 153. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. I d. at 154 (The court accurately reasoned that the U.C.C. was not applicable to the 
lease but would have applied if the transaction had been deemed a contract of sale.). 
79. This struggle is clearly illustrated by the recent case of Skelton v. Druid City 
Hasp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984); see supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text. 
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the parties in DeKalb had been guided by a codification of applica-
ble lease law, litigation might have been avoided. 
Distinguishing the common law bailment from other similar 
transactions is undoubtedly critical to any analysis of modern leas-
ing issues. But before Article 2A principles will be deemed 
applicable, an _agreement must not only meet the requirements of a 
common law bailment, but the transaction must also specifically 
fall within the "bailment for hire" classification.80 A "bailment for 
hire" is the only transaction considered by Alabama common law 
to be a lease of personal property.81 Thus, identifying the differ-
ences between "bailments for hire" and other types of bailments is 
essential to an understanding of personal property leases. 
C. Distinguishing Bailment for Hire 
The common law antecedent of the personal property lease 
was the locatio-rei bailment, in which both parties benefitted from 
the hiring of a thing.82 This "bailment for hire,"83 or "bailment for 
80. See Farmer v. Machine Craft, 406 So. 2d 981 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); see also supra 
notes 41-42 and accompanying text; cf. Dunavant Enter. v. Strachan Shipping Co., 730 F.2d 
665 (11th Cir. 1984) (court found that bailment relationship fell within admiralty jurisdic-
tion and that maritime common law supplied elements of bailment). 
Draft Article 2A defines a "lease" as "a transfer of the right to possession and use of 
goods for a term in return for consideration." DRAFT ALA. ConE § 7-2A-103(1)(j) (1990) 
(drafted verbatim from Uniform version). The drafters explain in the comments that: 
At common law a lease of personal property is a bailment for hire. While there are 
several definitions of bailment for hire, all require a thing to be let and a price for the 
letting. Thus, in modern terms and as provided in this definition, a lease is created 
when the lessee agrees to furnish consideration for the right to the possession and use 
of goods over a specified period of time. 
DRAFT ALA. ConE § 7-2A-103 comment (j) (1990). 
81. Accord Bain v. Culbert, 209 Ala. 312, 313, 96 So. 228, 229 (1923); Prince v. Ala-
bama State Fair, 106 Ala. 340, 342, 17 So. 449, 450 (1894); see also supra note 80 and infra 
notes 82-92. 
82. See J. STORY, supra note 42, § 368, at 323-24. Justice Story criticizes this definition 
as "incomplete" and articulates his own definition of a bailment for hire as also including 
cases of the hiring or letting "of labor and services, and of the carriage of goods." I d. at 324. 
83. Use of the term "bailment for hire" is common. See, e.g., Atmore Truckers Aas'n v. 
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1955); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. J.B. 
Maynard Constr., 259 Ala. 623, 625, 67 So. 2d 893, 895 (1953) (bailment "for hire and use" 
created when railroad company delivered cars containing ordered materials and turned con-
trol over to construction company); Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys., Mobile Co. v. Hames, 34 
Ala. App. 619, 622, 43 So. 2d 140, 142, cert. denied, 253 Ala. 132, 43 So. 2d 143 (1949) 
("bailee for hire"); U.C.C. § 2A-103 comment (j) (1990) ("At common law a lease of personal 
property is a bailment for hire."); see also Bain v. Culbert, 209 Ala. 312, 313, 96 So. 228, 229 
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mutual benefit,"84 is notably different in character and effect from 
other bailment transactions. The distinction is often crucial. 
Alabama courts have recognized that accurate characterization 
of the transaction usually determines liability.815 No special duty of 
care will exist if a court finds that no bailment was established. 86 If 
a court does find a bailment, the bailee's duty will depend on 
whether a "bailment for hire" (a lease of personal pr~perty) or 
some other kind of bailment was established. 
Although terminology and classification have historically va-
ried,87 Alabama courts have generally delineated three types of 
bailments. 88 The first exists where possession of an object is con-
veyed by the bailor so~ely to benefit the bailee. 89 While this kind of 
bailment is referred to as a "gratuitous bailment,"90 a better char-
(1923) ("lucrative bailment" is a relationship involving more than a gratuitous bailment). 
See also generally J. STORY, supra note 42, § 368 (The terms "bailment for mutual benefit" 
and "bailment for hire" are sometimes referred to as "lucrative" bailments). 
84. This term is used synonymously with "bailment for hire." See Aircraft Sales & 
Serv. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 511, 52 So. 2d 388, 391 (1951); White Swan Laundry v. Blue, 
223 Ala. 663, 137 So. 898 (1931). ' 
85. Sometimes, however, different characterizations of a transaction may result in the 
same disposition. See DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974) 
(holding that transaction was lease and not a sale, stated that results would be the same if 
the transaction had been deemed a sale as plaintiff contended), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th 
Cir. 1975). 
86. See Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. 181, 298 So. 2d 266 (1974); 
see supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text. 
87. See W. ELLIOTT, supra note 18, § 3, at 5-6; J. STORY, ·supra note 42, § 3, at·6-9. 
From the six Roman divisions of bailments four basic groupings emerged: (1) bailments 
for the bailor's sole benefit, (2) bailments for the bailee's sole benefit, (3) ordinary bailments 
for mutual benefit, and (4) exceptional bailments (which included "postmasters, innkeepers, 
and common carriers"). See W. ELLIOTT, supra note 18, § 4, at 6-9; see also supra note 44. 
88. Under Alabama law, bailments may also be termed either "gratuitous" or "lucra-
tive." See Bain v. Culbert, 209 Ala. 312, 313, 96 So. 228, 229 (1923); Prince v. Alabama State 
Fair, 106 Ala. 340, 342, 17 So. 449, 450 (1894). The classification of bailments as "gratui-
tous" usually includes bailments for the sole benefit of the bailor, as well as bailments for 
the sole benefit of the bailee. J. ScHOULER, supra note 44; § 6, at 4; see supra text accompa-
nying notes 82-87. Thus, a "lucrative" bailment would be tantamount to a bailment for 
mutual benefit. See, e.g., Ridgely Operating Co. v. White, 227 Ala. 459, 462, 150 So. 693, 695 
(1933) ("It is also true that, to require the duty of ordinary care upon a bailee, there must 
be some sort of consideration."). · 
89. See, e.g., Glenn v. Blackman, 33 Ala. App. 571, 575, 35 So. 2d 698, 701 (court 
found . that, at the time when bailed property was damaged, defendant was a bailee for his 
own benefit), cert. denied, 250 Ala. 664, 35 So. 2d 702 (1948). 
· 90. See supra note 88. 
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acterization of the transaction is probably that of a "loan."91 Under 
this arrangement, the bailee owes the greatest duty to care for the 
bailor's goods and is liable for the slightest negligence. 92 
The second classification is where the bailment is formed pri-
marily for custodial purposes, such as with a deposit. This 
transaction, known as a "bailment for the sole benefit of the 
bailor," is also distinct from a personal property lease.93 Under a 
bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor, the bailee owes the 
bailor only a slight degree of care for the property and is therefore 
liable only for gross negligence. 94 
The modern personal property lease can be traced directly to 
the third common law classification-"the bailment for hire,''9~ 
sometimes called a "bailment for mutual benefit."98 In this trans-
action, under an agreement for consideration, 97 the bailee takes 
property into his custody and care, and has temporary possession 
and use of the property.98 
91. 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 18 (1988) ("A bailment can be structured for the sole benefit 
of the bailee ... and is sometimes referred to as a 'loan.'" (footnotes omitted)). 
92. See, e.g., Glenn, 33 Ala. App. at 575, 35 So. 2d at 701 ("bailee for his own sole 
benefit ... owed extraordinary care toward the bailed property") (citing Thomas v. Hack-
ney, 192 Ala. 27, 29, 68 So. 296, 296 (1915) (Hackney court stated that a gratuitous bailee, 
in contrast to the bailee in Glenn, is "obligated to the owner of the [bailed property] only to 
the exercise of slight care, and [is] only liable for gross neglect or bad faith.'')). 
93. Like a gratuitous bailment for the sole benefit of the bailee, a bailment for the sole 
benefit of the bailor is sometimes styled as a "gratuitous bailment.'' See W. ELLIOTI, supra 
note 18, § 16, at 29-30. 
94. See Lincoln Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Armes, 217 Ala. 464, 117 So. 46 (1928) (gratui-
tous bailee holding books for bailor). The Lincoln court added that a gratuitous bailee may 
be "only liable for gross negligence or misconduct resulting in the [property's] loss or de-
struction." Id. at 464, 117 So. at 46. See also Bain v. Culbert, 209 Ala. 312, 313, 96 So. 228, 
229 (1923) (gratuitous bailee "only liable for gross negligence or bad faith in the premises"); 
see generally W. ELLIOTI, supra note 18, § 24, at 47 ("liable only for gross negligence"); J. 
ScHOULER, supra note 44, § 7. 
95. W. ELLI01T, supra note 18, § 24, at 47. 
96. See Boss, supra note 16, at 364 nn.31-32; Boss, supra note 17, at 73 n.23. 
97. See Atmore Truckers Ass'n v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 461, 464 (5th 
Cir. 1955); see also supra text accompanying note 80. 
The drafters of Article 2A state that "in modern terms and as provided in this defini-
tion, a lease is created when the lessee agrees to furnish consideration for the right to the 
possession and use of goods over a specified period of time.'' U.C.C. § 2A-103 comment (j) 
(1990). 
98. See Boss, supra note 17, at 74 (discussing the division between absolute property 
rights and "special property" rights). 
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In Atmore Truckers Association v. Westchester Fire Insur-
ance Co.,99 the issue of liability turned on the court's 
determination of whether defendant was a bailee for hire or a gra-
tuitous bailee. 100 The owner of a quantity of rayon yarn agreed to 
pay defendant a monthly fee in return for the yarn's storage. 101 
Mter the yarn was damaged by a fire while in the custody of the 
bailee, plaintiff insurer sued on the owner's behalf to recover for 
losses caused by fire and water damage.102 On appeal, the defend-
ant bailee asserted that the transaction was a gratuitous bailment 
and, therefore, liability would exist only if the bailee had been 
grossly negligent.103 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distin-
guished between a bailee for hire and a gratuitous bailee.104 The 
court held that the hallmark of a bailment for hire is the existence 
of consideration.106 Of course, any monthly fee paid to the bailee 
for storage of the yarn would constitute such consideration. 
The transaction in Atmore differs slightly from the modern 
commercial lease because the bailee accepted money for taking 
possession of the property. Conversely, in a personal property lease 
today, the party in possession (the lessee) pays for the right to 
have temporary possession and control. However, Atmore clearly 
illustrates a true bailment for hire and demonstrates that the com-
mon law duty to care for the property is still applicable to modern 
lease transactions. 
99. 218 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1955). 
100. Atmore, 218 F.2d at 464, aff'g 120 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Ala. 1954). 
101. Id. at 463-64. 
102. Id. at 461. 
103. Id. at 463. 
104. Atmore Truckers Ass'n v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 
1955). 
105. The Atmore court stated: 
"The general rule as to the consideration of a contract is well understood, and is the 
same in [the] case of the bailments as in all other contracts. The law does not under-
take to determine the adequacy of a consideration. That is left to the parties, who are 
the sole judges of the benefits or advantages to be derived from their contracts. It is 
sufficient if the consideration be of some value, though slight, or of a nature which 
may inure to the benefit of the party making the promise. Where such a considera-
tion exists, a contract cannot be said to be a nudum pactum; [sic] nor a bailment, a 
gratuitous undertaking." 
Atmore, 218 F.2d at 464 (quoting Prince v. Alabama State Fair, 106 Ala. 340, 345-46, 17 So. 
449, 450 (1894)). 
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D. Duties Owed by the Bailee for Hire 
1. Duties Imposed by Law.-Once a transfer of personal 
property is determined to be a bailment for hire (personal property 
lease), the duties, rights and liabilities of the transacting parties 
are determined both by the standard of care imposed by common 
law106 and either the express107 or implied108 bailment contract it-
self.109 Generally, the bailee for hire (lessee) will be held to an 
ordinary level of diligence, 110 and will therefore be answerable only 
for a failure to exercise such degree of care. 111 The parties, how-
ever, retain considerable flexibility in extending or limiting their 
obligations by contract. 112 
106. Bailment law sometimes looks to custom and usage of trade in order to fill any 
missing contract terms. Boss, supra note 22, at 52 n.81. 
107. See, e.g., Romine Constr. Co. v. Ted Warnke, Inc., 477 So. 2d 345 (Ala. 1985) 
(express oral contract for bailment); DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 154 
(N.D. Ala. 1974) (clear and unambiguous contract controls with respect to claim for breach 
of implied warranty in bailment or lease), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975). 
108. See White Swan Laundry v. Blue, 223 Ala. 663, 665, 137 So. 898, 899 (1931) (com-
mon law recognizes an implied obligation to exercise reasonable care in bailment for mutual 
benefit, in absence of express agreement to the contrary); Ex parte Mobile Light & R.R., 
211 Ala. 525, 527, 101 So. 177, 178 (1924); Kravitz v. Parking Serv. Co., 240 Ala. 467, 468, 
199 So. 731, 732 (1940); W. HALE, HAND-BOOK ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS § 14, 
at 51 (1896). 
109. J. ScHOULER, supra note 44, § 10; see also DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. 
Supp. 152, 154 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (concerning allegations of breach of implied warranty in 
bailment or lease arrangements court stated that "a contract between the parties which is 
clear and unambiguous as to their requisite responsibilities, or lack of same, controls the 
relationship."), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975). 
110. "Ordinary care" has been defined in a bailment case as "that degree of care with 
respect to the property which a man of average prudence and diligence would bestow on his 
own like property under like conditions. The law denominates this degree of care as ordi-
nary care.'' Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. J.B. Maynard Constr. Co., 259 Ala. 623, 625, 67 So. 
2d 893, 895 (1953) (citing Higman v. Camody, 112 Ala. 267, 272, 20 So. 480, 482 (1895)). 
111. Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys., Mobile Co. v. Hames, 34 Ala. App. 619, 622, 43 So. 
2d 140, 143 (bailee breached duty of care when he released automobile from garage to a 
third party without a claim check), cert. denied, 253 Ala. 132, 43 So. 2d 143 (1949); see also 
Anniston Lincoln-Mercury v. Mayse, 341 So. 2d 949, 950 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (automobile 
stolen while left with bailee for repairs); White Swan Laundry v. Blue, 223 Ala. 663, 665, 137 
So. 898, 899 (1931) ("reasonable care to preserve the property from loss or injury"). 
112. See White Swan Laundry v. Blue, 223 Ala. 663, 137 So. 898 (1931). C{. Cloud v. 
Moon, 290 Ala. 33, 273 So. 2d 196 (1973) (bailor has duty to warn bailee of dangerous condi-
tion such as likelihood of truck burning or exploding after delivery to bailee for repairs); 
Aircraft Sales & Serv. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 52 So. 2d 388 (1951) (certain legal duties were 
imposed on the bailor/owner in the absence of express contrary agreement where bailor's 
breach of care resulted in bailee's crashing the leased airplane). 
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Part of the bailee's obligation involves the legal duty of care 
for the bailed property. The bailee's general standard 'of care varies 
according to how the agreement is categorized at common law.113 
In a bailment for hire the bailee will generally114 be held to a rea-
sonable degree of diligence to care for the property.11~ 
The court in Atmore,116 having found a bailment for hire, held 
that the issue of liability was dependent upon whether defendant 
had met his obligation of ordinary and reasonable care.117 Simi-
larly, the. court in Anniston Lincoln-Mercury v. Mayse,118 held 
that defendant, a bailee for hire, was obligated to use ordinary care 
when an automobile was temporarily left with him for repairs.119 
Plaintiff sued after his vehicle was stolen, and the Alabama Court 
of Civil Appeals held that recovery under a tort theory is possible 
in a bailnient.120 In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court 
concluded that prima facie negligence will be imputed to a bailee 
for hire when he fails, upon demand, to either redeliver the prop-
erty to the bailor or to account for his failure to do so.121 
In addition to liability in tort, a bailee for hire may have cer-
tain implied contractual obligations. For example, the common law 
requir~s that the bailee in every bailment execute the contract in 
an honest and good-faith manner.122 A court may also find the con-
structive duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care for the bailed 
goods based solely on the bailment relationship.123 Moreover, in 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 80-105. 
114. The general duties of a bailee for hire may be modified by express contrary agree-
ment. See infra text accompanying notes 125-42. 
115. White Swan Laundry, 223 Ala. at 665, 137 So. at 899. 
116. 218 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1955). 
117. Atmore, 218 F.2d at 464. 
118. 341 So. 2d 949 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977). 
119. Mayse, 341 So. 2d at 949-50. 
120. Id. at 950. 
121. Id. 
122. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reeves,_ 440 So. 2d 1086, 1088-89 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1983) (bailee denied recovery when he did not act in good faith while repairing bailed auto-
mobile since he failed to comply with the Abandoned Motor Vehicle Act); Birmingham 
Loan Co. v. Klinner, 39 Ala..App. 125, 128, 95 So. 2d 402, 404-05 (1957) (" 'If the bailee •.• 
in good faith in fulfillment of the terms of the bailment •.. restores the property to the 
bailor before he is notifi~d that the true owner will look to him for it, no action will lie 
against him, for he has only done what was his duty.' ") (quoting Nelson v. Iverson, 17 Ala. 
216, 223 (1850)). See generally W. ELLIOTT, supra note 18, § 17, at 32; J. ScHOULER, supra 
note 44, § 8, at 6. 
123. See Ex parte Mobile Light & R.R., 211 Ala. 525, 526, 101 So. 177, 178 (1924) 
(court stated that liability of bailee would have to be based upon a contract "or upon a duty 
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some cases, the very existence of a bailment transaction may be 
implied by a court.124 
2. Duties Imposed by Contract: Extension and Limita-
tion.-Parties to a lease, however, retain the flexibility to alter 
such legally imposed obligations. A bailment transaction, as a con-
tract, may be oral,12cs implied,126 or express.127 In conjunction with 
the obligations imposed by law, 128 the parties to a bailment are 
generally subject to the principles of contract law.129 Nevertheless, 
the freedom to contract, though expansive/30 is not unlimited. 131 
growing out of the relations created by such contract."). Likewise, a bailor's duty may exist 
apart from the bailment contract. See Aircraft Sales & Serv. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 511, 52 
So. 2d 388, 391 (1951) ("The liability is not to be determined by the contract alone, but is 
rested on the bailor's duty beyond the contract."). 
124. "A constructive bailment arises where a person having possession of a chattel 
holds it under such circumstances that the law imposes upon him the obligation to deliver it 
to another." Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 304, 13 So. 2d 172, 174 (1943) (court found 
constructive bailment to exist pursuant to a quasi-contract where bailee, a minor, lacked 
capacity to make contract). See generally W. HALE, supra note 108, § 12, at 43. Accord W. 
HALE, supra note 108, § 2, at 17 ("[L]egal disability ... [is] to be used as a shield, and not 
as a sword ... ; their disabilities relieve them from liability on their contracts, but not from 
liability for their torts [such as conversion] .... [l]f they have come into possession of the 
goods, they must restore them, if possible."). 
125. See Metals, Inc. v. Jones, 468 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 1985); Romine Constr. Co. v. Ted 
Warnke, Inc., 477 So. 2d 345 (Ala. 1985); Messer v. Southern Airways Sales Co., 246 Ala. 
287, 20 So. 2d 585 (1945). 
126. Kravitz v. Parking Serv. Co., 29 Ala. App. 523, 199 So. 727, cert. denied, 240 Ala. 
467, 199 So. 731 (1940); Ex parte Mobile Light & R.R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924). See 
Atmore Truckers Ass'n v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 219 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1955) (ware-
houseman's acceptance of compensation, in excess of handling costs, was for storage, and 
bailment relationship was therefore created). 
127. See DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511 
F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975); Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water Works, 292 Ala. 147, 152, 
290 So. 2d 636, 640 (1974) ("'It is axiomatic that in bailments, as in other contracts, there 
must be a meeting of minds thereon and assent of both parties thereto; and a disclaimer of 
liability can only become effective if brought to the bailor's knowledge.' ") (quoting Kravitz 
v. Parking Serv. Co., 29 Ala. App. 523, 526, 199 So. 727, 729-30, cert. denied, 240 Ala. 467, 
199 So. 731 (1940)); Goldstein v. Harris, 24 Ala. App. 3, 130 So. 313, cert. denied, 221 Ala. 
612, 130 So. 315 (1930). 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 106-24. 
129. C{. Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Ala., 453 So. 2d 735, 741 (Ala. 1984) (exculpatory 
clause in apartment lease ineffective where clause not bargained for and effect was uncon-
scionable). See also supra note 127, and infra notes 131, 139 & 187-91 and accompanying 
text. 
130. The drafters of Article 2A have maintained an emphasis on freedom to contract. 
U.C.C. § 2A-101 comment (1990) ("[T]he common law of leasing is dominated by the need 
to preserve freedom of contract.") (commentary regarding the statutory analogue adopted 
by Article 2A from Article 2). 
131. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Ala., 453 So. 2d 735 (Ala. 1984) (applying ALA. 
ConE § 7-2-302 (1984) by analogy, court held exculpatory clause to be unconscionable and 
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In Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water Works/82 for exam-
ple, the court found that the question of whether the bailor had 
actually accepted the terms of a warehouse receipt was sufficient to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment.133 . The plaintiff/bailor 
had deposited certain equipme.nt with the defendants for stor-
age.134 The defendants gave the plaintiff warehouse receipts. 
Printed on the reverse side o~ each receipt was a clause that lim-
ited the p~riod within which an action for damages could be 
brought.135 The warehouse was flooded and the equipment dam-
aged.136 After the time specified in the contract for bringing suit 
had elapsed, the bailor sued to recover for damages.137 The trial 
therefore ineffective); Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 540 So. 2d 713 (Ala. 1989) (fol-
lowing Lloyd and holding that ALA. ConE § 7-2-302, governing unconscionability of 
contracts, applies by analogy to lease agreements); Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water 
Works, 292 Ala. 147, 290 So. 2d 636 (1974); Goldstein v. Harris, 24 Ala. App. 3, 130 So. 313 
(validity of contract for bailment of fur coat that excluded bailee's liability for loss due to 
fire was dependent on whether bailor fully assented to terms), cert. denied, 221 Ala. 612, 
130 So. 315 (1930); see also supra note 21. 
The rule allowing liability to be limited by special contract is applicable to both parties 
to the bailment. Birmingham Television, 292 Ala. at 152, 290 So. 2d at 640; see W. HALE, 
supra note 108, § 2, at 10-11, 27-28. 
The freedom to contract and the applicability of Article 2A are also affected by this 
State's version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C. or "Mini-Code") found at 
ALA. CODE §§ 5-19-1 to -31 (1981 & Supp. 1990). The Mini-Code, a consumer protection 
statute, governs consumer financing transactions, including consumer leases that would also 
come within the scope of Article 2A. Nevertheless, when a transaction falls within Article 
2A's analogue, as well as within the scope of other state statutory law-such as the U.C.C.C. 
(the "Mini-Code")-"the other statutory law typically controls." WHITE & SuMMERS, supra 
note 24, § 1-1, at 25. Presumably, a similar result would occur where a transaction involved 
both Article 2A and the Mini-Code. 
132. 292 Ala. 147, 290 So. 2d 636 (1974). 
133. Birmingham Television, 292 Ala. at 151, 290 So. 2d at 639. 
134. Id. at 149, 290 So. 2d at 637. 
135. Id. The receipt stated in pertinent part: 
NOTICE OF CLAIM AND FILING OF SUIT-Sec. 12 
(b) No action may be maintained by the depositor or others against the ware-
houseman for loss or injury to the goods stored unless tinlely written claim has been 
given • . . and unless such action is commenced either within nine months after date 
of delivery by warehouseman or within nine months after depositor of record •.• is 
notified that loss or injury to part or all of the goods has occurred, whichever time is 
shorter. 
Id. at 151, 290 So. 2d at 639. 
136. Birmingham Television, 292 'Ala. at 151, 290 So. 2d at 639. 
137. Id. at 151, 290 So. 2d at 639. 
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court granted summary judgment for the defendant based upon 
the running of the asserted limitation period, as reflected in the 
exculpatory clause on the warehouse receipts. 138 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that, as long 
as the terms were legal and not violative of public policy, parties to 
a bailment could limit their liability.139 The court, however, was 
particularly concerned with ensuring that parties to a bailment ac-
tually assented to such limiting terms, 140 and therefore held that 
an exculpatory clause is not enforceable unless the bailor knew of, 
and actually agreed to, such terms.141 Because a question existed as 
to whether the bailor had knowledge of and actually assented to 
such terms, summary judgment was reversed.142 
3. Miscellaneous Duties.-Alabama courts have primarily re-
lied upon two sources when outlining the duties owed under a 
"bailment for hire" relationship. First, courts have relied upon the 
duties imposed by the common law to provide the general standard 
of care owed by a bailee for hire.143 Second, courts have looked to 
the bailment contract itself in determining the extent to which the 
transacting parties have limited or expanded their own obliga-
tions.144 The following brief survey of case law reveals that 
Alabama courts have addressed certain recurring issues: (a) repair, 
maintenance, and insurance; (b) contract construction and inter-
138. Id. at 152, 290 So. 2d at 640. 
139. Id. Cf. Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Ala., 453 So. 2d 735 (Ala. 1984) (refusing to 
enforce an unconscionable exculpatory clause in a residential lease contract that purported 
to limit the bailor's liability), modified by Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 
107, 117 (Ala. 1985) ("[A] more comprehensive rule ... is that exculpatory clauses affecting 
the public interest are invalid . . . . Six criteria were established to identify the kind of agree-
ment in which an exculpatory clause is invalid as contrary to public policy." (citation 
omitted)). The Lloyd court stated that: "[E]nforcement of 'unbargained for' exculpatory 
clauses in residential leases [is] against the best interests of the citizens of Alabama and 
contrary to public policy." Lloyd, 453 So. 2d at 740. See generally W. HALE, supra note 108, 
§ 2, at 28 (explaining limits on the parties' ability to enlarge or diminish liability by 
contract). 
140. See Birmingham Television, 292 Ala. at 152, 290 So. 2d at 640; see also supra 
note 131 and accompanying text. 
141. I d. ("'Such special provision in a contract of bailment limiting bailee's liability, 
to be effective, must be known to, or brought to the notice of, the bailor, and be assented to 
by him.'" (quoting Kravitz v. Parking Serv. Co., 29 Ala. App. 523, 525, 199 So. 727, 729, 
cert. denied, 240 Ala. 467, 199 So. 731 (1940)) (emphasis supplied by Birmingham Televi-
sion court)). 
142. Birmingham Television, 292 Ala. at 154, 290 So. 2d at 642. 
143. See supra notes 94 & 106-24 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text. 
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pretation; and (c) contract termination and redelivery or 
conversion of goods. 
(a) Repair, Maintenance, and Insurance-Any bailee, in-
cluding a bailee for hire, generally has a duty to conform to 
contractual terms that address issues such as repair and mainte-
nance,146 as well as use of the property in a particular manner.146 
At common law, a bailee is liable for any incidental and ordinary 
expenses necessary for the care of the bailor's goods.147· The bailee 
is also liable for any extraordinary ·expenses occasioned by his neg-
ligent actions. 148 When the property is in need of repairs, the bailee 
may have an obligation to cease using the property and to notify 
the bailor of the need for repairs; or the bailee may make repairs 
himself.149 However, where a bailee voluntarily makes repairs, he is 
under an obligation to make them i_n good faith.160 
Although not required by law, the bailee may insure the bailed 
property for the mutual beriefit of the parties to the transaction.161 
Where such insurance is purchased for the mutual benefit of the 
parties, the bailee will likely be obligated to pay the fnsurance pro-
ceeds over to the bailor .162 
(b) Contract Construction and Interpretation-A second 
issue that has been 'addressed in Alabama is the construction and 
interpretation of the bailment contract. When a bailment or lease 
must be interpreted, courts apply accepted principles of construc-
tion to give . effect to the parties' intentions.163 In DeKalb 
145. See Boss, supra note 22, at 101. 
146. See Cartlidge v. Sloan, 124 Ala. '596, 26 So. 918 (1899). 
147. W. ELLIO'IT, supra note 18, § 14, at 27. 
148. Id. § 16, at 31. 
149. See, e.g., Higman v. Camody, 112 Ala. 267, 20 So. 480 (1895). . 
150. See W. HALE, supra note 108, § 2, at 28-30; W. ELLIO'IT, supr:a note 18, § 17. See 
also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 440 So. 2d 1086 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (bailee denied recov-
ery for repairs made to bailed property where repairs were not made in good faith). 
151. Goldstein v. Harris, 24 Ala. App. 3, 130 So. 3~3, cert. denied, 221 Ala. 612, 130 
So. 315 (1930). 
152. Goldstein, 24 Ala. App. at 4, 130 So. at 314 (court held that insurance proceeds 
were held in trust by bailee for bailor where bailed fur coat was damaged by fire). 
153. See, e.g., DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 153-54 (N.D. Ala. 1974) 
(transaction determined to be a lease and not a sale was "not covered by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, and is therefore, dependent upon the common law and the law of contracts 
for its construction and effect" (footnote omitted)), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975); see 
also Learned-Letcher Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 109 Ala. 169, 19 So. 396 (1895) (not error to 
admit parol evidence where controversy depended on construction of the writings). 
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Agresearch v. Abbott, 1154 for instance, the court evaluated the de-
fendant's claim of breach of express and implied warranties in 
light of the fact that the parties had reduced their agreement to a 
written document. The court held that, in a bailment or lease, the 
contract will control with regard to claims for breach of warranty if 
the parties' obligations are clearly and unambiguously ad-
dressed.11515 Therefore, where parties have reduced their agreement 
to writing, the document will control the court's construction and 
interpretation, in the absence of mistake or fraud. 1156 
(c) Contract Termination and Redelivery or Conversion of 
Goods-Alabama case law has also addressed issues regarding the 
termination of the bailment contract, the bailee's obligation to re-
deliver the bailed goods, and the bailee's liability for conversion. 
Return of the property is generally an express or implied element 
in every common law bailment.1157 At the bailment's termination, 
the bailee must redeliver the property over to the bailor even if the 
bailee becomes bankrupt while in possession of the property.u18 In 
fact, a bailor may establish a prima facie case of bailee's negligence 
if the bailee did not, upon demand, either return the property or 
explain his failure to do so.1159 A bailee may additionally be pre-
sumed negligent where the goods are lost, 160 unless the loss was 
caused by the violence of nature. 161 The bailee may also be liable 
for conversion of goods where he wrongfully delivered the property 
to someone else. 162 However, a bailee will generally not be liable to 
the true owner if the bailee in good faith delivered the property to 
154. 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975). 
155. DeKalb, 391 F. Supp. at 154. 
156. Id. 
157. See, e.g., In re Sitkin Smelting & Refining, 639 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) 
(in determining whether transaction was bailment or sale, stated that one test of bailment is 
whether option was retained to direct the return or sale of goods); W. ELLIOTT, supra note 
18, § 20, at 36; W. HALE, supra note 108, § 2, at 30-35. 
158. In re Sitkin Smelting & Refining, 639 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (court 
held that bailor's claim to property was superior to claims of bailee's secured creditors 
where transaction was deemed to be bailment rather than sale); see also Boss, supra note 
22, at 99-100 n.285. 
159. See Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys., Mobile Co. v. Hames, 34 Ala. App. 619, 43 So. 
2d 140, cert. denied, 253 Ala. 132,43 So. 2d 143 (1949); Anniston Lincoln-Mercury v. Mayse, 
341 So. 2d 949 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977). 
160. See Ridgely Operating Co. v. White, 227 Ala. 459, 150 So. 693 (1933). 
161. See Lauderdale County Coop. v. Lansdell, 263 Ala. 557, 83 So. 2d 201 (1955). 
162. See Pope & Co. v. Union Warehouse Co., 195 Ala. 309, 70 So. 159 (1915); infra 
note 172. 
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the bailor before notification that the true owner would look to 
him for the property.163 . 
The bailee is also obliged to use the property in accordance 
with the authority given to him. Use by the bailee beyond this au-
thority will likely constitute a conversion of the property for which 
the bailee would be liable.164 In Jones v. Americar/65 the Supreme 
Court of Alabama addressed the issue of a lessee's conversion of 
certain personal property retained under a lease agreement.166 A 
lessor of automobiles pursuant to a franchise agreement claimed 
that the lessee had become delinquent on payments.167 The lessee 
subsequently cancelled the contract, and the lessor brought an ac-
tion seeking damages for conversion of twenty-nine automobiles 
and for breach of contract.16s The court recognized the traditional 
definition of conversion: Conversion occurs when a party appropri-
ates a thing for his own use and enjoyment, or destroys or exercises 
dominion over property against the owner's claim of title.169 
Conversion may also result where: n> The bailee attempts an 
assignment contrary to the terms of the bailment contract, 170 (2) 
the bailee sells the goods without express authority/71 or J3) the 
bailee wrongfully delivers the property to a third-party claill)ing to 
be the true bailor.172 Liability for conversion may also arise where 
163. See Birmingham Loan Co. v. Klinner, 39 Ala. App. 125, 95 So. 2d 402 (1957). 
164. Cartlidge v. Sloan, 124 Ala. 596, 602, 26 So. 918, 920 (1899) ("The general rule is 
that if a bailee, having authority to use a chattel in a particular way, uses it in a different 
way, or to a greater extent than authorized, such unauthorized use is a conversion of the 
chattel •••. "); see also W. ELLIOTT, supra note 18, § 13; W. HALE, supra note 108, § 2, at 29 
(quoting Cartlidge, 124 Ala. at 602, 26 So. 2d at 920). 
165. 283 Ala. 638, 219 So. 2d 893 (1969). 
166. The court held that evidence supported a verdict for the lessor on the lessee's 
conversion but, nevertheless, reversed on other grounds. The court defined "conversion as 
consisting in .•. 'the appropriation of the thing to the ·party's own use and beneficial enjoy-
ment, or in its destruction, or in exercising of dominion over it, in exclusion or defiance of 
the plaintiff's right, or in withholding the possession from the plaintiff, under a claim of title 
inconsistent with his own.'" Jones, 283 Ala. at 647, 219 So. 2d at 900-01 (quoting Geneva 
Gin and Storage Co. v. Rawls, 240 Ala. 320, 322, 199 So. 734, 735 (1940)). 
167. Id. at 641, 219 So. 2d at 895. 
168. !d. at 642, 219 So. 2d at 895. 
169. Id. at 647, 219 So. 2d at 900-01. 
170. See Gwin v. Emerald Co., 201 Ala. 384, 386, 78 So. 758, 760 (1918) ("Any at-
tempted assignment, contrary to the terms of the bailment, is a conversion •.•. "). 
171. See Calhoun v. Thompson, 56 Ala. 166, 169 (1876) (unauthorized delivery of 
horse in violation of terms of the bailment amounted to conversion}. 
172. See Pope & Co. v. Union Warehouse Co., 195 Ala. 309, 70 So. 159 (1915) (bailee 
who turned cotton bales over to third party was liable to true owner for conversion). The 
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the bailee's agents negligently dispose of the property.173 Finally, 
where conversion results from a bailee's failure to exercise the de-
gree of diligence as required under the circumstances, he may be 
liable for the full value of the property if it was rendered 
worthless.174 
III. THE ALABAMA ARTICLE 2A PROJECT 
Given the foregoing description of the current state of per-
sonal property lease law in Alabama, it seems appropriate to 
describe, in general terms, the impact that Article 2A will likely 
have on this area of the commercial law in our state. A section-by-
section analysis of the new act, however, would be impractical for 
several reasons. First, comprehensive and accessible overviews of 
the proposed statute have been published elsewhere;1715 second, Ar-
ticle 2A is based, to a considerable extent, on Article 2 of the Code, 
and there is no dearth of authority treating recurring Article 2 is-
sues in Alabama/76 as well as commentary treating the essential 
similarity of Article 2A to its statutory analogue.177 Furthermore, 
the practitioner would be better aided by a discussion of both the 
scope and tenor of the deliberations by the Alabama Committee, as 
well as by a discussion of specific issues of particular interest to 
attorneys in the state. 
Pope court noted, however, that "the rule of liability would be otherwise if the bailee were 
induced to surrender the chattel by some plausible deception practiced upon him by the 
pseudo-bailor." Id. at 311, 70 So. at 160. 
173. See Allen v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 204 Ala. 652, 655, 86 So. 525, 528 (1920) 
(Bailee's agents negligently filled third party's meat order by taking meat owned by, and 
stored for, plaintiff; such appropriation by the bailee resulted in an unlawful interference of 
plaintiff's "use, enjoyment, or dominion over it[s property] ... as to be a conversion."). 
174. See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co. v. Lyle Serv. Ambulance-Wrecker, 
395 So. 2d 90, 92 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (citing Howell v. Dodd, 229 Ala. 393, 157 So. 211 
(1934)) (bailee has no legal right to withhold property from the holder of legal title). 
175. See Bayer, Personal Property Leasing: Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 43 Bus. LAW. 1491 (1988); Flick, Article 2A-Leases, 44 Bus. LAW. 1501 (1989); SYM-
POSIUM, supra note 5; see generally 2 P. ALcES, N. HANSFORD, P. LACY & R. ANZMNO, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSACTION GUIDE ch. 11 (1988) (written by Edwin E. Huddle-
son, III). 
176. See, e.g., Roszkowski, Contract Modification and the Statute of Frauds: Making 
Sense of Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 36 ALA. L. REv. 51 (1984); Note, 
United States v. West Side Bank: Expanding the Seller's Right to Reclaim Under Section 
2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 ALA. L. REv. 283 (1988). 
177. See Alces, Personal Property Leasing: Proposed Article 2A of the U.C.C., in 2 
NEW YORK PRACTICE GUIDE BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL§§ 19.01- 19.03 (E. Lach ed. 1990). 
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This section of the Article will, therefore, describe briefly the 
contours of the debate attending the promulgation of Article 2A in 
Alabama, and consider specific ·provisions under consideration by 
the Alabama Committee. As a prefatory matter, it must be empha-
sized that, at the time of this writing, the work of the Alabama 
Committee was not yet finished. But now is the time to apprise 
Alabama practitioners regarding the course of our deliberations. 
The Alabama Law Review Article 2A Symposium178 was pub-
lished shortly after the promulgation of Uniform Article 2A.179 The 
Symposium included both contributions from attorneys who had 
been directly involved in the drafting of Article 2A,180 and contri-
butions from attorneys who, although not involved in the drafting, 
maintained an interest in the commercial law and were concerned 
with adjustments to the Uniform Commercial Code. It is fair to 
state that the general conclusion of the participants was that Arti-
cle 2A should be enacted, but only after changes had been made to 
both the text and comments of the Uniform Act.181. 
Largely as a response to the inadequacies of the tmiform ver-
sion identified in the Alabama Law Review Article 2A Symposium, 
Donald Rapson and Robert Haydock, members of the Permanent 
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, and Harry Sig-
man, a California practitioner and past chairman of the Uniform 
Commercial Code Committee of that state's bar, developed a set of 
uniform amendments for Article 2A. That set of revisions came to 
be known as the "California/Massachusetts" version of the Act 
("Cal/Mass Amendments"). They treated generally three areas: 
Priority of claims to lease property; lessor and lessee damages; and 
provisions for consumer protection.182 
In December 1990, in response to the Cal/Mass Amendments, 
the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. promulgated a draft of certain uniform 
178. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5. 
179. Article 2A was promulgated in 1987. U.C.C. art. 2A foreword (1989). 
180. Marion W. Benfield, Jr., and Frederick H. Miller were members of the Article 2A 
drafting committee. U.C.C. art. 2A drafting committee members (1989). 
181. Homer Kripke foresaw problems with Article 2A. In fact, he stated he would have 
voted against the Article. Kripke, Some Dissonant Notes About Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REv. 
791, 801 (1988). . 
182. AB Edwin E. Huddleson, m, recognized in his 1990 supplement :to the UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSACTION GUIDE, two versions of Article 2A exist: "[T]he official 'uni-
form' version and the Massachusetts/California version." 2 P. ALcEs, N. HANsFORD, P. LAcY 
& R .ANzlVlNO, supra note 175, § 11:04 (Supp. 1990)~ 
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amendments to Article 2A ("Uniform Amendments"). These 1990 
uniform revisions have now been circulated to the various states 
for their consideration. The Uniform Amendments are based upon 
the Cal/Mass Amendments, but do not incorporate consumer pro-
tections to the same extent as the Cal/Mass Amendments.183 The 
Alabama Committee considered first the Cal/Mass Amendments 
and then, most recently, the 1990 Uniform Amendments. The pro-
posed Alabama draft of Article 2A represents a combination of 
these two amendment formulations, as well as nonuniform amend-
ments developed by the Alabama Committee in response to the 
perceived personal property leasing needs of this state. 
The Alabama Committee has endeavored to consider each pro-
vision of the Uniform Act, not just in terms of the tensions 
identified between the original Uniform Act, the 1990 Uniform 
Amendments, and the Cal/Mass version, but more importantly, in 
terms of the particular needs and interests of Alabama's commer-
cial jurisprudence. The following sections of this Article will 
highlight several of the more controversial issues raised with re-
gard to particular provisions of the Uniform Act and will describe, 
in general terms, the scope of the deliberations by the Alabama 
Committee with regard to these issues. To aid such presentation, 
both the uniform version of particular provisions and the current 
draft of the Alabama version of those same provisions ("Alabama 
Draft Proposal") will be compared and discussed. 
A. "Finance Leases" 
A finance lease transaction contemplates three parties: the 
supplier of certain goods (seller); the lessor of the goods (buyer); 
and the lessee of the goods (user). From the perspective of the 
lessee, the transaction may closely resemble a sale made by the 
supplier and financed by the financing lessor. The supplier is re-
sponsible for the fitness of the goods, and the lessor generally 
serves only a financing function. Given such a relationship among 
the parties, it makes good commercial sense to recognize the true 
posture of the parties and provide the lessee limited recourse 
against the financing lessor, thereby requiring the lessee to look to 
the supplier with regard to the fitness of the goods. 
183. See infra notes 245-52 and accompanying text. 
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The original uniform definition pf a "finance lease" is con-
tained in Section 2A-103(1)(g): 
§ 2A-103. Definitions and Index of Definitions. 
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires: 
(g) "Finance lease" means a lease in which (i) the lessor 
does not select, manufacture or supply the goods, (ii) 
the lessor acquires the goods or the right to posses-
sion and use of the goods in connection with the 
lease, and (iii) either the lessee receives a copy of the 
contract evidencing the lessor's purchase of the goods 
on or before signing the lease contract, or the lessee's 
approval of the contract evidencing the lessor's 
purchase of the goods is a condition to effectiveness 
of the lease contract.184 • 
The current draft of the Alabama version incorporates the 1990 
Uniform Amendment and defines finance lease as follows: 
§ 7-2A-103. DEFINITIONS AND INDEX OF DEFINITIONS. 
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires: 
(g) "Finance lease" means a lease with respect to which: 
(i) the lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply 
the goods; (ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the 
right to possession and use of the goods in connection 
with the lease; and (iii) one of the following occurs: 
(A) the lessee receives a copy of the contract by which 
the lessor acquired the goods or the right to posses-
sion and use of the goods before signing the lease 
contract; (B) the lessee's approval of the contract by 
which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to 
possession and use of the goods is a condition to ef-
fectiveness of the lease contract; (C) the lessee, before 
signing the lease contract, receives an accurate and 
complete statement designating the promises and 
warranties, and any disclaimers of warranties, limita-
tions or modifications of remedies, or liquidated 
damages, including those of a third party, such as the 
manufacturer of the goods, provided to the lessor by 
the person supplying the goods in connection with or 
184. U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g) (1989). 
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as part of the contract by which the lessor acquired 
the goods or the right to possession and use of the 
goods; or (D) if the lease is not a consumer lease, the 
lessor, before the lessee signs the lease contract, in-
forms the lessee in writing (a) of the identity of the 
person supplying the goods to the lessor, unless the 
lessee has selected that person and directed the lessor 
to acquire the goods or the right to possession and 
use of the goods from that person, (b) that the lessee 
is entitled under this Article to the promises and war-
ranties, including those of any third party, provided 
to the lessor by the person supplying the goods in 
connection with or as part of the contract by which 
the lessor acquired the goods or the right to posses-
sion and use of the goods, and (c) that the lessee may 
communicate with the person supplying the goods to 
the lessor and receive an accurate and complete state-
ment of those promises and warranties, including any 
disclaimers and limitations of them or of remedies. 185 
The difference between the two versions was suggested by the Cal/ 
Mass Amendments.186 The current version, as incorporated by the 
Alabama Draft Proposal, is designed to better serve principles of 
freedom of contract that are fundamental to the commercial law. 
The parties need not cast their agreement in terms of any 
magic words. The current version would recognize the finance lease 
incidents of the transaction so long as the lessor discloses all war-
ranties, along with disclaimers and limitations, provided by the 
lessor and suppli~r. Moreover, in nonconsumer leases/s7 the lessor 
may assure finance lease treatment by simply informing the lessee 
185. DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-103(1)(g) (1990); U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g) & comment (g) 
(1990); see generally U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37) (1989) and U.C.C. 2A-103(1)(j) & comment (j) 
(1990) ("create a sharper distinction .... [and] a clearer signal ... [regarding true leases 
and] disguised secured transactions"). See also M. RICE, EQUIPMENT FINANCING 62-71 (1981) 
("disguised secured transactions"). 
186. Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Business Law Sec-
tion on Proposed California Commercial Code Division 10 (Article 2A), 39 ALA. L. REv. 979, 
996-97, 1006-08 (1988) (Senate Bill 1580, as amended December 1, 1987) [hereinafter CALI-
FORNIA REPORT). 
187. "Consumer Lease" is defined as follows: 
[A] lease that a lessor regularly engaged in the business of leasing or selling makes to 
a lessee, except an organization, who takes under the lease primarily for a personal, 
family, or household purpose, if the total payments to be made under the lease con-
tract, excluding payments for options to renew or buy, do not exceed $100,000. 
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of the supplier's identity, and by apprising the. lessee that he may 
have rights against the supplier under the terms of the purchase 
contract executed by the supplier and the lessor. 
B. Unconscionability 
In commercial law the concept of unconscionability has been 
problematic.188 Perhaps it is best to simply consider the unconscio-
nability provision of Article 2 of the Alabama Commercial Code189 
as something of a statutory waste dump into which all the hard 
cases have been deposited in an attempt to avoid making bad law. 
The drafters of 1\rticle 2A proposed a version of the unconsciona-
bility provision that departs from the formulation of its Sales 
analogue: 
§ 2A-108. :Unconscionability. 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a lease contract or any 
clause of a lease contract to have been unconscionable at the time it 
was made the court may refuse to enforce the lease contract, or it 
may enforce the remainder of the lease contract without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of 
law finds tl].at a lease contract or any clause of a lease contract has 
been induced by unconscionable conduct or that unconscionable 
conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from a lease 
contract, the court may grant appropriate relief. 
(3) Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsec-
tion (1) or (2), the court, on its own motion or that of a party, shall 
afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to 
the setting, purpose, and effect of the lease contract or clause 
thereof, or of the conduct. 
( 4) In an action in which the lessee claims unconscionability 
with respect to a consumer lease: 
DRAFT ALA. CoDE § 7-2A-103(1)(e) (1990), incorporating-verbatim U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(e) 
(1990) (Uniform version does not recommend any particular dollar amount; Alabama Com-
mittee recommends the amount as noted}. 
188. See P. ALcEs, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANsACTIONS 1I 3.07 (1989). But see Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 
(1967} (attack on U.C.C. § 2-302}; see also Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 
YALE L.J. 757 (1969) (response to the Leff conclusion). 
189. ALA. CODE § 7-2-302 (1984). 
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(a) If the court finds unconscionability under subsection 
(1) or (2), the court shall award reasonable attorney's 
fees to the lessee. 
(b) If the court does not find unconscionability and the 
lessee claiming unconscionability has brought or 
maintained an action he [or she] knew to be ground-
less, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees 
to the party against whom the claim is made. 
(c) In determining attorney's fees, the amount of there-
covery on behalf of the claimant under subsections 
(1) and (2) is not controlling.190 
Contrast the above uniform formulation with the current draft of 
Alabama section 7-2A -108: 
§ 7-2A-108. UNCONSCIONABILITY. 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a lease contract or any 
clause of a lease contract to have been unconscionable at the time it 
was made the court may refuse to enforce the lease contract, or it 
may enforce the remainder of the lease contract without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsec-
tion (1), the court, on its own motion or that of a party, shall afford 
the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the 
setting, purpose, and effect of the lease contract or clause thereof, or 
of the conduct.191 
There is a symbiotic relationship between the commercial 
fraud law and unconscionability principles.192 The Alabama Com-
mittee has recognized this symbiotic relationship and has deleted 
190. U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1990). 
191. DRAFT ALA. CooE § 7-2A-108 (1990). 
192. See Drewry v. Drewry, 8 Va. App. 460,466, 383 S.E.2d 12, 18 (1989) (court found 
husband had exerted undue influence in securing spouse's waiver of support-action for 
unconscionability may be broader that an action for fraud: "A party may be free of fraud 
but guilty of overreaching or oppressive conduct in securing the agreement which is so pa-
tently unfair that courts of equity may refuse to enforce it."); see generally Mallor, 
Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065, 1072 (1986) ("Most 
judges and commentators agree that an unconscionability determination involves the evalu-
ation of two distinct but interrelated matters: how the parties arrived at the terms, and the 
justifiability of the terms themselves .... Given its concern for reality of consent, the proce-
dural aspect of unconscionability overlaps with the traditional contract doctrines regarding 
the formation of a contract and those that police agreements for fraud, duress, and the 
like."). Mallor at 1072 (footnotes omitted). 
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subsections (2) and ( 4) of the Uniform Act. The decision to delete 
these two uniform subsections is the product of the conclusion that 
the common law193 and statutory194 fraud theories of recovery 
available in Alabama provide s~cient protection to those who 
may be the victims of insidious overreaching. 
193. See Transport Acceptance Corp. v. Vincent, 521 So. 2d 976, 979 (Ala. 1988); 
Sharp Elec. Corp. v. Shaw, 524 So. 2d 586, 592 (Ala. 1987); Boswell v. Coker, 519 So. 2d 493, 
495 (Ala. 1987); Continental Elec. Co. v. American Employers' Ins., 518 So. 2d 83, 88 (Ala. 
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988); Coleman v. Gulf Life Ins., 514 So. 2d 944, 946 
(Ala. 1987}. 
194. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-100 to -104 (1975) provide as follows: 
§ 6-5-100. FRAUD- RIGHT OF ACTION GENERALLY •. 
Fraud by one, accompanied with damage to the party defrauded, in all cases 
gives a right of action. 
§ 6-5-101. SAME - MISREPRESENTATIONS OF MATERIAL FACTS. 
Misrepresentations of a material fact made willfully to deceive, or recklessly 
without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and 
innocently and acted on by the opposite party, constitute legal fraud. 
§ 6-5-102. SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACTS. 
Suppression of a material fact which the party is under an obligation to commu-
nicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the 
confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case. 
§ 6-5-103. DECEIT- RIGHT OF ACTION GENERALLY. 
Willful misrepresentation of a material fact made to induce another to act, and 
upon which he does act to his injury, will give a right of action. Mere concealment of 
such a fact, unless done in such a manner as to deceive and mislead, will not support 
an action. In all cases of deceit, knowledge of a falsehood constitutes an essential 
element. A fraudulent or reckless representation of facts as true, which the party may 
not know to be false, if intended to deceive, is equivalent to a knowledge of the 
falsehood. 
§ 6·5-104. SAME - FRAUDULENT DECEIT. 
(a) One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his 
position to his injury or risk is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers. 
(b) A deceit within the meaning of this section is either: 
(1) The suggestion as a fact of that which is not true by one who does not 
believe it to be true; 
(2) The assertion as a fact of that which is not true by one who has no 
reasonable ground for believing it to be true; 
(3} The suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it or who 
gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of commu-
nication of that fact; or 
(4) A promise made without any intention of performing it. 
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C. Modifications of Contracts and Statute of Frauds 
Requirements 
The common law "pre-existing duty" rule1·95 proved unwork-
able in the commercial law. Section 2-209196 of the uniform sales 
law is designed to replace the formalistic and fictional "considera-
tion" basis of the common law rule with a provision that considers 
business realities as well as the dangers of commercial fraud and 
extortion attending modification of commercial contracts.197 
Under both Alabama section 7-2-209198 and draft section 7-2A-
208, 199 an attempted modification that fails to satisfy the statutory 
or contractual requirements may still be effective as a waiver.200 
With regard to the impact of the statute of frauds upon the con-
tract as modified, compare uniform section 2A-208 and the extant 
Alabama draft of the same provision: 
§ 2A-208. Modification, Rescission and Waiver. 
(1) An agreement modifying a lease contract needs no consider~ 
ation to be binding. 
(2) A signed lease agreement that excludes modification or re~ 
scission except by a signed writing may not be otherwise modified or 
rescinded, but, except as between merchants, such a requirement on 
a form supplied by a merchant must be separately signed by the 
other party. 
(3) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not 
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2), it may operate as a 
waiver. 
( 4) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory por-
tion of a lease contract may retract the waiver by reasonable 
notification received by the other party that strict performance will 
be required of any term waived, unless the retraction would be un-
just in view of a material change of position in reliance on the 
waiver.201 
195. The "pre-existing duty" rule is based on the premise that if a party presently 
owes a duty under contract, additional consideration is necessary to modify that duty. See 
Griffin v. Hardin, 456 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (promise to do what one is 
already under legal obligation to do is not sufficient consideration for another contract). 
196. u.c.c. § 2-209 (1989). 
197. Id. § 2-209 comment 1. 
198. ALA. CODE § 7-2-209 (1984). 
199. DRAFT ALA. CoDE § 7-2A-208 (1990). 
200. ALA. CoDE § 7-2-209(4) (1984); DRAFT ALA. CoDE § 7-2A-208(4) (1990). 
201. U.C.C. § 2A-208 (1990). 
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Compare the draft Alabama version, section 7-2A-208: 
§ 7-2A-208. MODIFICATION, RESCISSION, AND WAIVER. 
(1) An agreement modifying a lease contract needs no consider-
ation to be binding. , 
(2) A signed lease agreement that excludes modification or re- · 
scission except by a signed writing may not be otherwise modified or 
rescinded, but, except as between merchants, such a requirement on 
a form supplied by a merchant must be separately signed by the 
other party. 
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Ar-
ticle (Section 7-2A-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified 
is within its provisions. . 
( 4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not 
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2), it may operate as a 
wru.ver. 
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting a executory portion 
of a lease contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification 
received by the other party that strict performance will be required 
of any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of 
a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.202 
The statute of frauds provision of section 7-2A-208(3) was in-
corporated into the Alabama draft because . the reasons offered for 
its exclusion in the official comment to the uniform act were not 
convincing.203· "The commercial community's interest in certainty 
would [be] better served by clearly providing that a modification 
would have to satisfy the"204 writing requirement provided in sec-
tion 7-2A-201, rather than by leaving this issue to ad hoc 
resolution by the courts of this state.· 
D. Warranty of Quiet Possession 
The Alabama version of section 2A-211 tracks exactly the lan-
guage of the uniform act: 
§ 7-2A-211. WARRANTIES AGAINST INTERFERENCE AND 
AGAINST INFRINGEMENT; LESSEE'S. OBLIGATION 
AGAINST INFRINGEMENT. 
,202. DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-208 (1990). 
203. DRAFT ALA. CoDE§ 7-2A.:208 Alabama comment (1990). 
204. Id. 
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(1) There is in a lease contract a warranty that for the lease 
term no person holds a claim to or interest in the goods that arose 
from an act or omission of the lessor, other than a claim by way of 
infringement or the like, which will interfere with the lessee's enjoy-
ment of its leasehold interest. 
(2) Except in a finance lease there is in a lease contract by a 
lessor who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind a 
warranty that the goods are delivered free of the rightful claim of 
any person by way of infringement or the like. 
(3) A lessee who furnishes specifications to a lessor or a supplier 
shall hold the lessor and the supplier harmless against any claim by 
way of infringement or the like that arises out of compliance with 
the specifi.cations.206 
However, it is not the language of the section but rather the 
language of its official comment that has caused the Committee 
some problem. In pertinent part, the official comment explains 
that "[t]he warranty of quiet possession was abolished with respect 
to sales of goods. "206 In the draft Alabama comment, the Commit-
tee takes issue with such statement in that: 
In Alabama, it is not clear that the warranty of quiet enjoyment was 
so much abolished in the Sales article as it was subsumed in the 
broad language of section 7-2-312 ... . The express inclusion of the 
warranty of quiet enjoyment in this provision does not imply that 
there is no such warranty in the Sales analogue. 207 
While the Alabama Committee recognized the potential inconsis-
tency between the sales and lease law, adjustment of the sales 
commentary to reflect the conclusion that the warranty of quiet 
possession is alive and well in Alabama sales transactions would be 
beyond the charge of the Alabama Article 2A Committee. The ref-
erence to the sales analogue in the lease provision comment should 
suffice. 
205. DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-211 (1990); u.c.c. § 2A-211 (1990). 
206. U.C.C. § 2A-211 comment (1990) (citing U.C.C. § 2-312 comment 1 (1989)). 
207. DRAFT ALA. CODE§ 7-2A-211 Alabama comment (1990). The committee cites City 
Car Sales v. McAlpin, 380 So. 2d 865, 867 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979), cert. denied, 380 So. 2d 869 
(Ala. 1980), in which the court refers to the official comment to section 7-2-312. That com-
ment provides that disturbance of quiet possession is evidence of the breach of the warranty 
of title. 
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E. Disclaimer of Warranties 
Perhaps no area of the commercial law -is of greater or more 
frequent concern to both general practitioners aJ;J.d commercial law 
specialists than warranties and warranty disclailners. The implied 
warranties of the sales law go to the very foundations of the par-
ties' deal.208 These warranties vindicate the transactors' 
expectations, and are likely to be the focus of litigation concerning 
the parties' performance of, and conformity with, the terms- of 
their contract. Insofar as leases contemplate an allocation of prop-
erty rights not wholly distinct from-the division of property rights 
recognized in the sale of goods, 209 Article 2A contains both express 
and implied warranty provisions that similarly establish the con-
tours of the lessor's and lessee's undertaking. And just as the 
consideration of warranties is fundamental to th~ lease transaction, 
the disclaimer of warranties concomitantly impacts the lessor/ 
lessee relationship. 
The Alabama draft version of section 2A-214, "Exclusion or 
Modification of Warranties," departs from the uniform version. 
The uniform version provides: 
§ 2A-214. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties. 
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit a warranty 
must be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each' 
other; but, subject to the provisions of Section 7-2A-202 on parol or 
extrinsic evidence, negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent 
that the construction is unreasonable. · 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied 
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language 'must 
208. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4 (1989) ("[T]he whole purpose of the law of warranty is 
to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell • • . . [l]n determining 
what [the parties] have agreed upon[,] good faith is a factor and consideration should be 
given to the fact that the probability is small that a real price is intended to be exchanged 
for a pseudo-obligation."). 
209. See Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, 540 So. 2d 713 (Ala. 1989); W.E. Johnson 
Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1~70); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 
244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968) (Article 2 applies to lease agreements). But see Briscoe's 
Foodland v. Capital Assocs., 502 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1986); United States Armament Corp. v. 
Charlie Thomas Leasing Co., 661 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Mays v. Citizens & S. 
Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 602, 208 S.E.2d 614 (1974), overruled on ·other grounds, Mock v. 
Canterbury Realty Co., 152 Ga. App. 872, 264 S.E.2d 489 (1980) (leases not covered by 
Article 2). 
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mention "merchantability", be by a writing, and be conspicuous. 
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if 
it is in writing, is conspicuous and states, for example, "There is no 
warranty that the goods will be fit for a particular purpose." 
(4), 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), but subject to subsection 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all im-
plied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as 
is," or "with all faults," or by other language that in 
common understanding calls the lessee's attention to 
the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that 
there is no implied warranty, if in writing and 
conspicuous; 
(b) if the lessee before entering into the lease contract 
has examined the goods or the sample or model as 
fully as desired or has refused to examine the goods, 
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects 
that an examination ought in the circumstances to 
have revealed; and 
(c) an implied warranty may also be excluded or modi-
fied by course of dealing, course of performance, or 
usage of trade. 
( 4) To exclude or modify a warranty against interference or 
against infringement (Section 2A-211) or any part of it, the language 
must be specific, be by a writing, and be conspicuous, unless the 
circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or 
usage of trade, give the lessee reason to know that the goods are 
being leased subject to a claim or interest of any person. 210 
Compare the above uniform version with its draft Alabama 
counterpart: 
§ 7-2A-214. EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF 
WARRANTIES. 
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit a warranty 
must be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each 
other; but, subject to the provisions of Section 7 -2A-202 on parol or 
extrinsic evidence, negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent 
that the construction is unreasonable. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3): 
210. U.C.C. § 2A-214 (1990). 
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(a) to exclude or modify the implied warranty of 
merchantability or any part of it the language must 
mention merchantability, be by a writing,. and be con-
spicuous. Language to. exclude the implied warranty 
of merchantability is sufficient if it is in writing, is 
conspicuous and states, for example, "There is no 
warranty that the goods will be merchantable". 
(b) to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness 
the exclusion must be by a writing and be conspicu-
ous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of 
fitness is sufficient if it is in writ4lg, is conspicuous 
and states, for example, "There is no warranty that 
the goods will be fit for a particular purpose." 
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(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), but subject to subsection 
(4), 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all im-
plied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as 
is,'.' or "with all faults," or by other language that in 
common understanding calls the lessee's attention to 
the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that 
there is no implied warranty, if in writing and 
conspicuous; 
(b) if the lessee before entering into the· lease contract 
has examined the goods or the sample or model as 
fully as desired or has refused to examine the goods, 
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects 
that an examination 'ought in the circumstances to 
have revealed; and 
I (c) an implied warranty may also be excluded or modi-
fied by course of dealing, course of performance, or 
usage of trade. 
( 4) To exclude or modify a warranty against interference or 
against infringement (Section 7-2A-211) or any part of it, the lan-
guage must be specific, be by a writing, and be conspicuous, unless 
the circumstances, including course of performance, course of deal-
ing, or usage of trade, give the lessee reason to know that the goods 
are being leased subject to a claim or interest of any pers~n. 
(5) Nothing in subsection (2) or subsection (3)(a) or in Section 
7-2A-215 shall be construed so as to limit or exclude the lessor's lia-
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bility for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer 
goods.211 
The Committee's intention is that the Alabama version be un-
derstood as departing formally rather than substantively from the 
uniform act. The design of the Alabama departures from the uni-
form formulation is to provide transactors better guidance with 
regard to the drafting of effective disclaimers. Further, Article 2A 
should be construed in a manner consistent with the law that has 
been derived from the Sales analogue. For example, the decision by 
the Supreme Court of Alabama in Gaylord v. Lawler Mobile 
Homes,212 that "as is," "with all faults," and "as they stand" dis-
claimers will be ineffective in sales of new goods, should apply as 
well to the lease of new goods once Article 2A is enacted in Ala-
bama. Finally, the inclusion of nonuniform subsection (5) brings 
this section of the proposed lease law into conformity with the par-
allel Alabama sales provision. 
F. Third-Party Beneficiaries of Warranties 
Intimately related to the issue of what warranty protections 
are afforded the lessee are questions concerning the scope of per-
sons and interests protected by express and implied warranties. 
What renders these issues particularly problematic is the parallel 
development of products liability law as the tort response to 
breach of warranty claims for injuries sustained by remote par-
ties.213 The uniform version of section 2A-216, "Third-Party 
Beneficiaries of Express and Implied Warranties,"214 and its Ala-
bama draft variation represent efforts to maintain the delicate 
balance between these parallel jurisprudential paths. As with the 
Sales Article, the Lease Article provides three alternative formula-
tions of the third-party beneficiary provision. And just as Alabama 
211. DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-214 (1990). 
212. 477 So. 2d 382 (Ala. 1985). 
213. According to Professor Prosser, a third party beneficiary, as if standing in the 
shoes of the purchaser, can sue for breach of warranty. W. KEEToN, D. DoBBS, R. KEEToN & 
D. OWENS, PROSSER AND KEEToN ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 95A (5th ed. 1984). Section 2-318 
of the uniform commercial law presents three alternatives for third party beneficiaries of 
warranties. Alternative A limits the beneficiaries to "family, household and guests of the 
purchaser." Alternatives B and C further expand the class of beneficiaries. U.C.C. § 2-318 
comment 3 (1989). 
214. U.C.C. § 2A-216 (1990). 
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has selected Alternative Bin the sales law,21G the draft Lease Arti-
cle chooses Alternative B as follows:216 
§ 2A-216. Third-Party Beneficiaries of Express and Implied 
Warranties. 
ALTERNATIVE A 
A warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee under this Article, 
whether express or implied, extends to any natural person who is in 
the family or household of the lessee or who is a guest in the lessee's 
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, con-
sume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by 
breach of the warranty. This section does not displace principles of 
law and equity that extend a warranty to or for the 'benefit of a 
lessee to other persons. The operation of this section may not be 
excluded, modified, or limited, but an exclusion, modification, or 
limitation of the warranty, including any with respect to rights and 
remedies, effective against the lessee is also effective against any 
beneficiary designated under this section. 
ALTERNATIVE B 
A warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee under this Article, 
whether express or implied, extends to any natural person who may 
reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods 
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. This section 
does not displace principles of law and equity that extend a war-
ranty to or for the benefit of a lessee to other persons. The operation 
of this section may not be excluded, modified, or limited, but, an 
exclusion, modification, or limitation of the warranty, including any 
with respect to rights and remedies, effective against the lessee is 
also effective against the beneficiary designated under this section. 
215. ALA. CODE § 7-2-318 (1984). 
216. Alternative A limits the extension of the warranty to family, household members, 
or guests of the lessee. Alternatives B and C extend the warranty to any "person who may 
reasonably be expected to use" the goods. In addition, Alternative B states that: "This sec-
tion does not displace principles of law and equity that extend a warranty to or,for the 
benefit of a lessee to other persons." DRAFT' ALA. CoDE § 7-2A-216(2) (1990). 
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ALTERNATIVE C 
A warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee under this Article, 
whether express or implied, extends to any person who may reasona-
bly be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and 
who is injured by breach of the warranty. The operation of this sec-
tion may not be excluded, modified, or limited with respect to injury 
to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends, but an 
exclusion, modification, or limitation of the warranty, including any 
with respect to rights and remedies, effective against the lessee is 
also effective against the beneficiary designated under this 
section.217 
Compare with that uniform provision, the following Alabama draft: 
§ 7-2A-216. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF EXPRESS 
AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES. 
(1) A warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee under this Arti-
cle, whether express or implied, extends to any natural person if it is 
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume, or be af-
fected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the 
warranty. 
(2) This section does not displace principles of law and equity 
that extend a warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee to other 
persons. 
(3) The operation of this section may not be excluded, modified, 
or limited, but an exclusion, modification, or limitation of the war-
ranty, including any with respect to rights and remedies, effective 
against the lessee is also effective against any person referred to in 
subsections (1) and (2) of this section.218 
The Alabama draft provision is intended to substantially mir-
ror in substance the analogous Alabama sales law section. 
Therefore, the same results should be obtained under both bodies 
of law. The differences in the lease formulation should merely clar-
ify the complete and correct reading of the sales law provision. 
The Alabama draft differs from the uniform lease provision in 
the last clause of what would be Alabama Code section 7 -2A-
216(3). The Alabama adjustment deletes the word "beneficiary"219 
and instead inserts for clarification "any person referred to in sub-
217. U.C.C. § 2A-216 (1990). 
218. DRAFT ALA. ConE § 7-2A-216 (1990). 
219. U.C.C. § 2A-216 Alternative B (1990). 
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sections (1) and (2) of this section."220 This clarification should 
make it clear that a disclaimer effective against the lessee would 
also be effective against both those persons specifically described 
in subsection (1), as well as those parties who would be deemed 
beneficiaries by operation of subsection (2). 
In Bishop v. Sales, 221 the Al~bama Supreme Court determined 
that Alabama Code section 7-2-318, which codified Alternative B 
of the Uniform Act, abrogates any vertical privity ~f contract re-
quirement.~22 It is contemplated 'that case law development will 
determine wheth~r vertical privity is similarly vitiated in the lease 
law by this section. Of course, this provision woUld in no way im-
pair the right of a party who is in privity of contract with the 
lessor to bring an action against the lessor notwithstanding the fact 
that the plaintiff would not be within the class of third-party bene-
ficiaries· recognized in the section. 
G. Alienation of Lessor's and Lessee's Interests· 
Secured financing has grown substantially in the course of:the 
last th4'ty years, roughly since the promulgation of Article 9 of the 
U.C.C. governing security'interests in personal_property. The de-
sign of Article 9 has been to provide for the ·grant of a collateral 
interest in multifarious property interests, so that the oWners of 
those interests may realize the valu~ of such ass~ts. in the more 
liquid form of financing proceeds, secured by tho~e assets. 
Likewise, a lease of personal property contemplates a division 
of property interests between the lessor and lessee. The lessor re-
tains the right to the flow of lease payments as well as a residual 
interest in the personalty, and the le~see enjoys th~ right to use the 
property. Insofar as either or both parties.to a lease contract may· 
be or ~ay choose to become Article 9 debt~rs,223 it is crucial that 
220. DRAFr AL'"' CODE § 7-2A-216(3) (1990). 
221. 336 So. 2d 1340 (Ala. 1976). 
222. Bishop, 336 So. 2d at 1345. · 
223. "Debtor" is defiited as follows: 
[T]he person who owes payment or other performance of the. obligation secured, 
whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of ac-
counts or chattel paper. Where the debtor and the owner ofthe collateral are not the 
same person, the term "debtor" means the owner of the collateral in any provision of 
the Article dealing with the collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing .with the 
obligation, and may include both where the context so requires .... 
u.c.c. § 9-105(1)(d) (1989). 
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commercial law determine the rights of the lessee, lessor, and se-
cured creditor of the lessor or of the lessee inter se. 
Section 2A -303 of the uniform act formulates rules governing 
the alienability of the lessor's and lessee's interests in the lease 
property. The original version of section 2A-303 provided that: 
§ 2A-303. Alienability of Party's Interest Under Lease Contract or 
of Lessor's Residual Interest in Goods; Delegation of Performance; 
Assignment of Rights. 
(1) Any interest of a party under a lease contract and the les-
sor's residual interest in the goods may be transferred unless 
(a) the transfer is voluntary and the lease contract pro-
hibits the transfer; or 
(b) the transfer materially changes the duty of or materi-
ally increases the burden or risk imposed on the other 
party to the lease contract, and within a reasonable 
time after notice of the transfer the other party de-
mands that the transferee comply with subsection (2) 
and the transferee fails to comply. 
(2) Within a reasonable time after demand pursuant to subsec-
tion (l)(b), the transferee shall: 
(a) cure or provide adequate assurance that he [or she] 
will promptly cure any default other than one arising 
from the transfer; 
(b) compensate or provide adequate assurance that he 
[or she] will promptly compensate the other party to 
the lease contract and any other person holding an 
interest in the lease contract, except the party whose 
interest is being transferred, for any loss to that party 
resulting from the transfer; 
(c) provide adequate assurance of future due perform-
ance under the lease contract; and 
(d) assume the lease contract. 
(3) Demand pursuant to subsection (l)(b) is without prejudice 
to the other party's rights against the transferee and the party 
whose interest is transferred. 
( 4) An assignment of "the lease" or of "all my rights under the 
lease" or an assignment in similar general terms is a transfer of 
rights, and unless the language or the circumstances, as in an assign-
ment for security, indicate the contrary, the assignment is a 
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delegation of duties by the assignor to the assignee and acceptance 
by the assignee constitutes a promise by him [or her] to perform 
those duties. This promise is enforceable by either the assignor or 
the other party to the lease contract. 
(5) Unless otherwise agreed by the lessor and the lessee, no del-
egation of performance relieves the assignor as against the other 
party of any duty to perform or any liability for default. 
(6) A right to damages for default with respect to the whole 
lease contract or a right arising out of the assignor's due perform-
ance of his [or her] entire obligation can be assigned despite 
agreement otherwise. 
(7) To prohibit the transfer of an interest of .a party under a 
lease contract, the language of prohibition must be specific, by a 
writing, and conspicuous. 22" 
Professor Steven Harris identified troublesome ambiguities 
and uncertainties that might result from the promulgation of that 
uniform provision. 22~» Rather than burden the commercial finance 
industry with what he perceived to be the troublesome priority im-
plied by uniform section 2A-303, he proposed that the grant of 
collateral interests in property created by a personal property lease 
be excepted from the operation of section 2A-303. 226 The promot-
ers of the Cal/Mass Amendments were persuaded by Harris's 
analysis and suggested that the provision be modified.227 The 1990 
Uniform Amendments follow the Cal/Mass· lead and contain the 
revised version of section 2A-303 currently incorporated in the pro-
posed Alabama Act: · · 
§ 7-2A-303. ALIENABILITY OF PARTY'S INTEREST UNDER 
LEASE CONTRACT OR OF LESSOR'S RESIDUAL INTEREST 
IN GOODS; DELEGATION OF PERFORMANCE; TRANSFER 
OF RIGHTS. 
(1) As used in this section, "creation of a security interest" in-
cludes the sale of a lease contract that is . subject to Article 9, 
Secured Transactions, by reason of Section 7-9-102(1)(b). 
(2) Except as ·provided in subsections (3) and ( 4), a provision in 
a lease agreement which (i) prohibits the voluntary or involuntary 
transfer, including a transfer by sale, sublease, creation or enforce-
ment of a security· interest, or attachment, levy,' or other judicial 
224. u.c.c. § 2A-303 (1989). 
225. Harris, The Rights of Creditors Under Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REv. 803 (1988). 
226. Id. at 844-45. 
227. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 186, at 1011-14. 
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process, of an interest of a party under the lease contract or of the 
lessor's residual interest in the goods, or (ii) makes such a transfer 
an event of default, gives rise to the rights and remedies provided in 
subsection (5), but a transfer that is prohibited or is an event of 
default under the lease agreement is otherwise effective. 
(3) (a) A provision in a lease agreement which (i) prohibits the 
creation or enforcement of a security interest in an interest of a 
party under the lease contract or in the lessor's residual interest in 
the goods, or (ii) makes such a transfer an event of default, is not 
enforceable unless, and then only to the extent that, there is an ac-
tual transfer by the lessee of the lessee's right of possession or use of 
the goods in violation of the provision or an actual delegation of a 
material performance of either party to the lease contract in viola-
tion of the provision. (b) Neither the granting nor the enforcement 
of a security interest in (i) the lessor's interest under the lease con-
tract or (ii) the lessor's residual interest in the goods is a transfer 
that materially impairs the prospect of obtaining return perform-
ance by, materially changes the duty of, or materially increases the 
burden or risk imposed on, the lessee within the purview of subsec-
tion (5) unless, and then only to the extent that, there is an actual 
delegation of a material performance of the lessor. 
( 4) A provision in a lease agreement which (i) prohibits a trans-
fer of a right to damages for default with respect to the whole lease 
contract or of a right to payment arising out of the transferor's due 
performance of the transferor's entire obligation, or (ii) makes such 
a transfer an event of default, is not enforceable, and such a transfer 
is not a transfer that materially impairs the prospect of obtaining 
return performance by, materially changes the·duty of, or materially 
increases the burden or risk imposed on, the other party to the lease 
contract within the purview of subsection (5). 
(5) Subject to subsections (3) and (4): 
(a) if a transfer is made which is made an event of de-
fault under a lease agreement, the party to the lease 
contract not making the transfer, unless that party 
waives the default or otherwise agrees, has the rights 
and remedies described in Section 7-2A-501(2); 
(b) if paragraph (a) is not applicable and if a transfer is 
made that (i) is prohibited under a lease agreement 
or (ii) materially impairs the prospect of obtaining re-
turn performance by, materially changes the duty of, 
or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on, 
the other party to the lease contract, unless the party 
not making the transfer agrees at any time to the 
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transfer in the lease contract or otherwise, then, ex-
cept as limited by contract, (i) the transferor is liable 
to the party not making the transfer for damages 
caused by the transfer to the extent that the damages 
could not reasonably be prevented by the party not 
making the transfer and (ii) a court having jurisdic-
tion may grant other appropriate relief, including 
cancellation of the lease contract or an injunction 
against the transfer. 
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(6) A transfer of "the lease" or of "all my rights under the 
lease", or.a transfer in similar general terms, is a transfer of rights 
and, unless the language or the circumstances, as in a transfer for 
security, indicate the contrary, the transfer is a delegation of duties 
by the transferor to the transferee. Acceptance by the transferee 
constitutes a promise by the transferee to perform those duties. The 
promise is enforceable by either the transferor or t~e other party to 
the lease contract. 
(7) Unless otherwise agreed by the lessor and the lessee, a dele-
gation of performance does not relieve the transferor as against the 
other party of any duty to perform or of any liability for default. 
(8) In a consumer lease, to prohibit the transfer of an interest of 
a party under the lease contract 9r to make a transfer an event of 
default, the language must be specific, by a writing, and 
conspicuous. 228 
The current draft of Alabama Article 2A incorporates the 1990 
Uniform Amendments in order to facilitate the hypothecation of 
valuable interests in secured financing. Under subsection (2), a 
transfer prohibited by the lease gives rise to the remedies of sub-
section (5), but is otherwise effective. In other words, even though 
the transfer was contractually prohibited, the unauthorized trans-
fer is not automatically void. 229 In addition, the default remedy 
228. DRAFT ALA. ConE§ 7-2A-303 (1990) (adopting verbatim U.C.C. § 2A-303 (1990)). 
229. U.C.C. § 2A-303 comment 1 (1990) provides as follows: 
[Transfers] are effective, notwithstanding a provision in the lease agreement prohibit-
ing the transfer or making the transfer an event_ of default. Although the transfers are 
effective, the provision in the lease agreement is nevertheless enforceable, but only as 
provided in subsection (5) which limits the prejudiced party to remedies for default 
under this Article if the transfer has been made an event of default, or damages if the 
transfer is prohibited. 
Id. See also U.C.C. § 9-311 (1989) (voluntary and involuntary transfers of an interest). 
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under subsection (5)(b) is limited to actual damages which could 
not have been mitigated by the nontransferor.230 
Under subsection (3), a lease provision prohibiting the transfer 
of a security interest is not enforceable unless there is an actual 
transfer that "involves an actual delegation of a material perform-
ance of the lessor" in violation of the lease. 231 Thus, according to 
comment 4,232 granting a security interest, by itself, does not trig-
ger a right to a remedy; there must be a transfer and the 
delegation of a material performance owed to the non-transferring 
party under the lease contract. As comments 2 and 7 make clear, 
materiality is judged by the existence of a further duty under the 
lease that the transferring party owes to the nontransferring 
party.233 Comment 7234 indicates that the distinction between oper-
ating leases and nonoperating leases would aid In the 
understanding of the subsection. 23~ 
H. Liquidation of Damages 
The rule was established in Alabama before the promulgation 
of the U.C.C. that a liquidated damages provision in a contract 
would not be enforced to the extent that it represented a penalty 
rather than the parties' good faith effort to allocate risks attending 
the default of one or the other of the parties to the contract.236 In 
fact, it has been held in this state in a case decided after the enact-
ment of Article 2 that the voidability of a liquidated damages 
provision as a penalty is to be determined as a matter of law by the 
230. U.C.C. § 2A-303(5)(b)(ii) (1990). Of course, this statement is true if the transfer is 
prohibited. If the transfer is an event of default under the lease agreement, then under 
subsection (5)(a) the non-transferor is entitled to lease remedies and/or the remedies 
granted under section 7-2A-501(2). 
231. Id. § 2A-303 & comment 4. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. comments 2 & 7. 
234. Id. comment 7. As an aside, comment 7 actually refers to subsection (4) rather 
than subsection (3), but the wording and substance of these subsections are quite similar 
such that the comment is relevant to each subsection. 
235. U.C.C. § 2A-303 comment 7 (1990) ("Although the distinction may be difficult to 
draw in some cases, it is instructive to focus on the differences between 'operating' and 'non-
operating' leases as generally understood in the marketplace."). 
236. See Pasquale Food Co. v. L & H Int'l Airmotive, 51 Ala. App. 127, 136, 283 So. 2d 
438, 446, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 795, 283 So. 2d 448 (1973). 
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court, rather than as a matter of fact.237 Section 2A-504, of both 
the uniform version238 and the Alabama draft,239 provides the 
following: 
§ 2A-504. Liquidation of Damages. 
(1) Damages payable by either party for default, or any other 
act or omission, including indemnity for loss or diminution of antici-
pated tax benefits or loss or damage to lessor's residual interest, may 
be liquidated in the leas~ agreement but only at an amount or by a 
formula that is reasonable in light of the then anticipated harm 
caused by the default or other act or omission. 
(2) If the lease agreement provides for liquidation of damages, 
and such provision does not comply with subsection (1), or such pro-
vision is an exclusive or limited remedy that circumstances cause to 
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this 
Article. 
(3) If the lessor justifiably withholds or stops delivery of goods 
because of the lessee's default or insolvency (Section 2A-525 or 2A-
526), the lessee is entitled to restitution of any amount by which the 
sum of his [or her] payments exceeds: 
(a) the amount to which the lessor is entitled by virtue of 
terms liquidating the lessor's damages in accordance 
with subsection (1); or 
(b) in the absence of those terms, 20 percent of the then 
present value of the total r~nt the lessee was obli-
gated to pay for the balance of the lease term, or, in 
the case of a consumer lease, the lesser of sue~ 
amount or $500. 
(4) A lessee's right to restitution under subsection (3) is subject 
to offset to the extent the lessor establishes: 
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of 
this Article other than subsection (1); and 
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the 
lessee directly or indirectly by reason of the lease 
contract. 240 
237. Pasquale, 51 Ala. App. at 137, 283 So. 2d at 447 (holding that liquidated damages 
provision was not unreasonable, and therefore not void as a penalty). 
238. U.C.C. § 2A-504 (1990). 
239. DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-504 (1990). 
240. U.C.C. § 2A-504 (1990); see also DRAFT ALA. CoDE § 7-2A-504 (1990). 
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Although the statute itself has not caused the Committee con-
siderable trouble, there is some concern about the official comment 
promulgated by the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. That comment ex-
plains, in pertinent part, that the provision in the Article 2 
analogue241 "providing that a term fixing unreasonably large liqui-
dated damages is void as a penalty, was ... not incorporated."242 
While that would seem to suggest that an unreasonably large liqui-
dated damages amount would not be voidable as a penalty, the 
comment further explains that "[b ]y deleting the reference to un-
reasonably large liquidated damages the parties are free to 
negotiate a formula, restrained by the rule of reasonableness in 
this section."248 The design is of course to encourage the parties' 
incorporation of liquidated damages provisions, unburdened by the 
concern that a court will, post hoc, void the liquidated damages 
figure as a penalty. The drafters note that insofar as the liquidated 
damages provision would often contemplate reimbursement of the 
lessor for tax loss, it would not be unusual for the liquidated dam-
ages amount to exceed, perhaps by many times, the value of the 
lease property. 244 
The Alabama Committee has expressed some concern with the 
inference that might be drawn from the deletion of the provision 
from the Sales analogue that an unreasonably large liquidated 
damages figure would be void as a penalty. Instead, it would seem 
that if tax laws could result in losses that exceed substantially the 
value of the lease property, there is in fact nothing unreasonable 
about a liquidated damages clause that would provide for recovery 
of such tax losses. That construction of the uniform statute and 
commentary may be preferable to a reading that would suggest 
that a venerable contract principle in this state, the voidability of 
unreasonable liquidated damages, would be abrogated by adoption 
of uniform section 2A-504. 
241. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1989). In particular, section 2-718(1) provides that damages may 
be liquidated "at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual 
harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfea-
sibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy." ld. § 2-718(1). 
242. U.C.C. § 2A-504 comment (1990). 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
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I. Consumer Issues 
Professor Fred Miller, a member of the Permanent Editorial. 
Board of the Uniform Commercial. Code and a drafter of uniform 
Article 2A, wrote an article in the Alabama Law Review Article 2A 
Symposium concerning the Uniform Act's treatment of recurring 
consumer issues. 2415 In light of Professor Miller's observations, the 
sponsors of the Cal/Mass Amendment package evidently felt that 
it was necessary to provide consumers more protection than was 
offered by the uniform version of the act. While it is not feasible to 
survey all the consumer provisions in the uniform and Cal/Mass 
versions, there is one section in particular that has generated con-
siderable discussion among the · members of the Alabama 
Committee. Reproduced below are the provisions of uniform sec-
tion 2A-516 and the Cal/Mass counterpart: 
Uniform provision-
§ 2A-516. Effect- of Acceptance of Goods; Notice of Default; Burden 
of Establishing Default After Acceptance; Notice of Claim or Litiga-
tion to Person Answerable Over. 
(1) A lessee must pay rent for any goods accepted in accordance 
with the lease contract, with due allowance for goods rightfully re-
jected or not delivered. 
(2) A lessee's acceptance of goods precludes rejection of the 
goods accepted. In the case of a finance lease, if made with knowl-
. edge of a nonconformity, acceptance cannot be revoked because of 
. it. In any other case, if made with knowledge of a nonconformity, 
acceptance cannot be revoked because of it unless the acceptance 
'was on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be 
seasonably cured. Acceptance does not of itself impair any other 
remedy provided by this Article or the lease agreement for 
· nonconformity. 
(3) If a tender has been accepted: 
(a) within a reasonable time· after the lessee discovers or 
should have discovered any default, the lessee shall 
notify the lessor and the supplier, or be barred from 
any remedy; 
(b) except in the case of a consumer lease, within a rea-
sonable time after the lessee receives notice of 
litigation for infringement or the like (Section 2A-
245. Miller, Consumer Leases Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, 39 ALA. 
L. REv. 957 (1988). 
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211) the lessee shall notify the lessor or be barred 
from any remedy over for liability established by the 
litigation; and 
(c) the burden is on the lessee to establish any default. 
(4) If a lessee is sued for breach of a warranty or other obliga-
tion for which a lessor or a supplier is answerable over: 
(a) The lessee may give the lessor or the supplier written 
notice of the litigation. If the notice states that the 
lessor or the supplier may come in and defend and 
that if the lessor or the supplier does not do so he [or 
she] will be bound in any action against him [or her] 
by the lessee by any determination of fact common to 
the two litigations, then unless the lessor or the sup-
plier after seasonable receipt of the notice does come 
in and defend he [or she] is so bound. 
(b) The lessor or the supplier may demand in writing 
that the lessee turn over control of the litigation in-
cluding settlement if the claim is one for 
infringement or the like (Section 2A-211) or else be 
barred from any remedy over. If the demand states 
that the lessor or the supplier agrees to bear all ex-
pense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, then 
unless the lessee after seasonable receipt of the de-
mand does turn over control the lessee is so barred. 
(5) The provisions of subsections (3) and (4) apply to any obli-
gation of a lessee to hold the lessor or the supplier harmless against 
infringement or the like (Section 2A-211).246 
Cal/Mass Amendment and Alabama proposal-
§ 7-2A-516. EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE OF GOODS; NOTICE OF 
DEFAULT; BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING DEFAULT AFTER 
ACCEPTANCE; NOTICE OF CLAIM OR LITIGATION TO PER-
SON ANSWERABLE OVER. 
(1) A lessee must pay rent for any goods accepted in accordance 
with the lease contract, with due allowance for goods rightfully re-
jected or not delivered. 
(2) A lessee's acceptance of goods precludes rejection of the 
goods accepted. In the case of a finance lease, other than a consumer 
lease in which the supplier assisted in the preparation of the lease 
contract or participated in negotiating the terms of the lease con-
246. U.C.C. § 2A-516 (1989). 
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tract with the lessor, if made with knowledge of a nonconformity,. 
acceptance cannot be revoked because of it. In any other case, if 
made with knowledge of a nonconformity, acceptance cannot be re-
voked because of it unless the acceptance was on the reasonable 
assumption that the nonconformity would be seasonably cured. Ac-
ceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy provided by this 
Article or the lease agreement for nonconformity. 
(3) If a tender has been accepted: 
' (a) within a reasonable time after the lessee discovers or 
should have dis~overed. any. default, the lessee shall 
notify the lessor and the supplier, if any, or be barred. 
from any remedy against the party not notified; 
(b) within a reasonable time after- the lessee receives no-
. tice of litigation for infringement or the like (Section 
7-2A-211) -the lessee shall notify the lessor or be 
barred from any remedy over for liability established 
by the litigation; and 
(c) the burden is on the lessee to establish any default. 
(4) If a lessee is sued fo! breach of a warranty or other obliga-
tion for which a lessor or a supplier is answerable over the following 
apply: 
(a) The lessee may give the lessor or the supplier, or 
both, written notice of the litigation. If the notice 
states that the person notified may come in and de-
fend and that if the person notified . does not do so 
that person will be bourid in any action against that 
person by the lesse.e by any determination of fact 
common to the two litigations, then unless the person 
notified after seasonable receipt of the notice does 
come in and defend that ·person is so bound. 
(b) The lessor or the supplier may demand in -writing 
that the lessee turn over control of the litigation in-
cluding settlement if the claim is one for 
infringement or the like (Section 7-2A-211) or else be 
barred from any remedy over. If the demand states 
that the lessor or the supplier agrees to bear all ex-
pense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, then 
unless the lessee after seasonable receipt of the de-
mand does turn over control the lessee is so barred. 
(5) Subsections (3) and (4) apply to any obligation 
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of a lessee to hold the lessor or the supplier harmless against in-
fringement or the like (Section 7-2A-211).247 
(6) Subsection (3) shall not apply to a consumer lease. 
The sponsors of the Cal/Mass Amendments have not ex-
plained their reasons for modifying the right of a consumer lessee 
to revoke acceptance of goods in the case of a finance lease. 248 The 
inference may be reasonably drawn, however, that the design is to 
give effect to consumer expectations that the typical consumer fi-
nance lease is akin to a sale. When a consumer goes to a Chevrolet 
dealership to buy a Camaro, she may decide instead to lease the 
car, not because the consumer is aware of the different allocation 
of rights and liabilities in a lease (as contrasted with a sale), but 
because the monthly lease payments are within her means while 
the purchase payments are not. Furthermore, in the consumer fi-
nance lease setting, the Cal/Mass Amendment seems to recognize 
the operation of commercial principles that led to the informed de-
velopment of the "close-connectedness" doctrine in commercial 
paper law.249 Under the Cal/Mass Amendments, the consumer fi-
nance lessee would not however have an absolute right to revoke 
vis-a-vis the financer. The right of revocation would only arise "if 
the supplier assisted in the preparation of the lease contract or 
participated in the negotiation of the lease contract terms with the 
lessor,"2110 a prototypical close-connectedness situation.2111 
247. DRAFT ALA. ConE§ 7-2A-516 (1990). The 1990 Article 2A Uniform Amendments 
have adopted the above Cal/Mass Amendments verbatim. See U.C.C. § 2A-516 (1990). 
248. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 186, at 1035; see DRAFT ALA. ConE§ 7-2A-516(2) 
(1990). 
249. Arcanum Nat'l Bank v. Hessler, 69 Ohio St. 2d 549, 433 N.E.2d 204 (1982); 
Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 538 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Kaw Valley 
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Riddle, 219 Kan. 550, 549 P.2d 927 (1976); Waterbury Sav. Bank 
v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967); Milwaukee Acceptance Corp. v. 
Dore, 43 Wis. 2d 412, 168 N.W.2d 594 (1969); see also Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase 
Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. 
REV. 605 (1981). 
250. DRAFT ALA. ConE§ 7-2A-516 Alabama comment (1990). 
251. See Arcanum Nat'l Bank v. Hessler, 69 Ohio St. 2d 549, 433 N.E.2d 204, 210 
(1982) (citing J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL ConE § 14-8, at 481 (2d ed. 
1972)). Professors White and Summers list five factors which are indicative of a close con-
nection between the lender and the seller: 
(1) the lender drafting forms for the seller; 
(2) the lender approving and/or establishing the seller's procedures; 
(3) the lender making an independent check on the debtor's credit or some 
other direct contact between the lender and the debtor; 
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The justification for the previous uniform version focuses on 
the fact that the financing lessor is really in no position to police 
the fitness of the goods. Any enhanced right to revoke a consumer 
lease may therefore have a chilling effect on the financing of con-
sumer leases-clearly a result inconsistent with the best interests 
of consumers and financers alike. This tension, of course, has at- · 
tended the promulgation of 'all consumer legislation.2152 For these 
reasons, the Alabama Committee decided to follow the Cal/Mass 
version, rather than the old uniform formulation. 
J. Lessor's Action for Rent and the Duty to -Mitigate 
The default provisions of Uniform Article 2A that would sup-
plement a lessor's common law remedies, for the most part, track 
parallel provisions in the Sales analogue.2158 Given fundamental dif-
ferences between the ~ocation of property rights in sales and 
leases, however, there are necessarily some differences in the for-
mulation of the default prQvisions of the two ~ticles.2154 These 
sections have been carefully consid~red by the Alabama Law Re-
view Article 2A Symposi~ commen~ators. 21515 In particular, section 
(4) the seller's heavy reliance on the lender; and 
(5) common or connected ownership or management of the seller and lender. 
J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, supra § 14-8, at 481. 
252. McKenzie, The Cost of Protection, L.A. Daily J., March 31, 1982, at 4, col. 3 
("Once we have recognized the potential cost of increased product safety[,] the problems of 
whether products should be made safer [are] no longer simple. Not all consumers demand 
the same of safety, given the price ...• Diversity, not uniformity, is the hallmark of society, 
and an economic system that serves society must reflect this."). 
253. Compare U.C.C. § 2A-523 (1990) with U.C.C. § 2-703 (1989) (these sections list 
available remedies in the event of lessee or buyer default, respectively). More specifically, 
subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of section 2-703 correspond generally to subsections 
(c), (d), (b), (e), (e) and (a) of section 2A-523, respectively. 
254. Compare U.C.C. § 2A-527(5) (1990) ("lessor is not accountable to the lessee for 
any profit made on any disposition" in an event of lessee default) and id. § 2A-529(2)-(3) 
("lessor shall hold [identified goods] for the lessee during remaining lease term" unless the 
lessor elects to dispose of such goods) (emphasis added) with U.C.C. § 2-706(6) (1989). Al-
though section 2-706(6) provides that "[t}he seller is not accountable to the [defaulting] 
buyer for any profit made on any resale," it makes clear that "[a] person in the position of a 
seller (Section 2-707) or a buyer who has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked accept-
ance must account for any excess over the amount of his security interest." Id. 
255. See, e.g., Benfield, Lessor's Damages Under Ar.ticle 2A After Default by the 
Lessee As to Accepted Goods, 39 ALA. L. R~v. 915 (1988); Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambigu-
ities in Lessors' Remedies Under Article 2A: Using Official Comments to Cure Problems in 
the Statute, 39 ALA. L. REv. 875 (1988). 
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2A-529, concerning the lessor's action for rent upon the lessee's de-
fault, has generated considerable discussion during the Alabama 
Committee's deliberations. 
Compare the original uniform version of this provision, 
§ 2A-529. Lessor's Action for the Rent. 
(1) After default by the lessee under the lease contract (Section 
2A-523(1)), if the lessor complies with subsection (2), the lessor may 
recover from the lessee as damages: 
(a) for goods accepted by the lessee and for conforming 
goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasona-
ble time after risk of loss passes to the lessee (Section 
2A-219), (i) accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of 
default, (ii) the present value as of the date of default 
of the rent for the remaining lease term of the lease 
agreement, and (iii) any incidental damages allowed 
under Section 2A-530, less expenses saved in conse-
quence of the lessee's default; and 
(b) for goods identified to the lease contract if the lessor 
is unable after reasonable effort to dispose of them at 
a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably 
indicate that effort will be unavailing, (i) accrued and 
unpaid rent as of the date of default, (ii) the present 
value as of the date of default of the rent for the re-
maining lease term of the lease agreement, and (iii) 
any incidental damages allowed under Section 2A-
530, less expenses saved in consequence of the 
lessee's default. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), the lessor shall hold 
for the lessee for the remaining lease term of the lease agreement 
any goods that have been identified to the lease contract and are in 
the lessor's control. 
(3) The lessor may dispose of the goods at any time before col-
lection of the judgment for damages obtained pursuant to 
subsection (1). If the disposition is before the end of the remaining 
lease term of the lease agreement, the lessor's recovery against the 
lessee for damages will be governed by Section 2A-527 or Section 
2A-528. 
( 4) Payment of the judgment for damages obtained pursuant to 
subsection (1) entitles the lessee to use and possession of the goods 
not then disposed of for the remaining lease term of the lease 
agreement. 
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(5) After a lessee has wrongfully rejected ,or revoked acceptance 
of goods, has failed to pay rent then due, or has repudiated (Section 
2A-402), a lessor who is held not entitled to rent under this section 
must nevertheless be awarded damages for non-acceptance under 
Sections 2A-527 and 2A-528.258 
with the 1990 Uniform Amendment version, adopting the Cal/ 
Mass Amendment, and incorporated into the Alabama Draft: 
§ 2A-529. LESSOR'S ACTION FOR THE RENT. 
(1) Mter default by the lessee under the lease contract of the 
type described in Section 2A-523(1), or 2A-523(3)(a) or, if agreed, 
after other default by the lessee, if the lessor complies with subsec-
tion (2), the lessor may recover from the lessee as damages: 
(a) for goods accepted by the lessee and not repossessed 
by or tendered to the ~essor, and for conforming 
goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasona-
ble time after risk of loss passes to the lessee (Section 
2A-219), (i) accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of 
entry of judgment in favor of the lessor, (ii) the pre-
sent value as _of the same date of the rent for the then 
remaining lease term of the lease agreement, and (iii) 
any incidental damages allowed under Section 2A-
530, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's 
default; and 
(b) for goods identified to the lease contract if the lessor 
is unable after reasonable effort to dispose of them at 
a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably 
indicate that effort will be unavailing, (i) accrued and 
unpaid rent as of the date of entry of judgment in 
favor of the lessor, (ii) the present value as of the 
same date of the rent for the then remaining lease 
term of the lease agreement, and (iii) any incidental 
damages allowed under Section 2A-530, less expenses 
saved in consequence of the lessee's default. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), the lessor shall hold 
for the lessee for the remaining lease term of the lease agreement 
any goods that have been identified to the lease contract and are in 
the lessor's control. 
(3) The lessor may dispose of the goods at any time before col-
lection of the judgment for damages obtained pursuant to 
256. U;C.C. § 2A-529 (1989). 
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subsection (1). If the disposition is before the end of the remaining 
lease term of the lease agreement, the lessor's recovery against the 
lessee for damages is governed by Section 2A-527 or Section 2A-528, 
and the lessor will cause an appropriate credit to be provided 
against any judgment for damages to the extent that the amount of 
the judgment exceeds the recovery available pursuant to Section 2A-
527 or 2A-528. 
(4) Payment of the judgment for damages obtained pursuant to 
subsection (1) entitles the lessee to the use and possession of the 
goods not then disposed of for the remaining lease term of and in 
accordance with the lease agreement. 
(5) After a lessee has wrongfully rejected or revoked acceptance 
of goods, has failed to pay rent then due, or has repudiated (Section 
2A-402), a lessor who is held not entitled to rent under this section 
must nevertheless be awarded damages for non-acceptance under 
Sections 2A-527 and 2A-528.267 
Perhaps the most notable contrast between the two versions is 
that the Uniform Amendment imposes upon the lessor a broader 
duty to mitigate2l)8 his damages against the lessee in certain limited 
circumstances. 2 1')9 The original uniform version limited the lessor's 
duty to mitigate to a more limited situation;260 the lessor could 
have therefore simply recovered the lease property and held it for 
the remainder of the lease term, apparently without any obligation 
to relet the property for the lessee's account. 261 The reason for the 
original Uniform Act's seemingly flagrant departure from common 
law and statutory principles of mitigation was based on the nature 
of the lessor's and lessee's interests in leased property. Arguably, 
the lessor is the owner of the leased property and should not be 
required, or even encouraged by personal property lease law, to 
compromise that absolute ownership interest. Accordingly, this po-
sition holds that Article 2A should not mandate that such goods be 
relet. Given that view of the lessor's ownership interest, the anal-
257. u.c.c. § 2A-529 (1990); DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-529 (1990). 
258. U.C.C. § 2A-529(1)(b) (1990). 
259. Id. § 2A-529(1)(b) (duty to mitigate arises as to undelivered, identified goods, 
repossessed goods, and goods that have been tendered back by the lessee). 
260. U.C.C. § 2A-529(1)(b) & comment (1989) (duty to mitigate arises only "with re-
spect to goods identified to the lease contract (but not accepted by the lessee-see 
subparagraph (l)(a)) .... "). 
261. U.C.C. § 2A-529 (1989); accord Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in Lessors' 
Remedies Under Article 2A: Using Official Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute, 39 
ALA. L. REV. 875, 887 (1988). 
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ogy to, and imposition by, sales law of a duty upon a seller to resell 
the goods after a buyer's breach262 is simply inapposite. 
Professor Marion Benfield championed forcefully the position 
taken by the Cal/Mass Amendments and now adopted by the 1990 
Uniform Amendments;263 in fact, his article in .. the Alabama Law 
Review Article 2A Symposium occasioned these ame~dments. 264 
The current formulation requires only that the lessor make "a rea-
sonable effort to dispose of'' the goods. 2615 The penalty for the 
lessor's failure to act in that reasonable manner is denial of dam-
ages as described in subsection (l)(b).266, 
K. Protection of Lessor's Residual Interest 
Perhaps not unrelated to the issues presented in the preceding 
section regarding damages is the issue of the lessee's duty to pro-
tect the lessor's residual interest267 in the leased goods. It is, after 
all, the lessor's residual interest that is at risk when the lessor is 
required to mitigate by selling or reletting the lease property. 
There was originally no uniform provision that specifically formu-
lated a lessee's duty to protect the lessor's residual interest, nor 
was there a provision that provided that the lessee's compromise of 
the lessor's residual interest would constitute an event of default, 
absent such provision in the lease agreement. It is, of course, true 
that carefully drafted lease agreements should provide just such a 
lessee duty and event of default.268 
262. Compare U.C.C. § 2-706 (1989) with id. § 2-708. _ 
263. Benfield, Lessor's Damages Under Article 2A After Default by the Lessee As to 
Accepted Goods, 39 ALA. L. REv. 915, 921 (1988). 
264. Letter from Donald J. Rapson to James S. Roberts, Coordinator, Alabama Law 
Review Article 2A Symposium (Aug. 13, 1987) (discussing protection of lessor's right regard-
ing residual interest). 
265. U.C.C. § 2A-529(1)(b) (1990). 
266. Id. comment 1 ("Absent a lease contract provision to the contrary, an action for 
the full unpaid rent (discounted to present value as of the time of entry of judgment as to 
rent due after that time) is unavailable as to goods not lost or damaged only if the lessee 
retains possession of the goods or the lessor is or apparently will be unable to dispose of 
them at a reasonable price after a reasonable effort!' (emphasis added)). 
267. Id. § 2A-529 comment 1 ("In a lease, the lessor always has a residual interest in 
the goods which the lessor usually realizes upon at the end of a lease term by either sale or a 
new lease."). 
268. See 2 P. ALcES, N. HANSFORD, P. LACY & R ANziVINo, supra note 175, § 
11:22(14)(d) (lessee's assignment to creditors constitute default). 
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The California draft of the version of Article 2A incorporates a 
provision concerning the lessor's residual interest, and that provi-
sion has now been incorporated into the 1990 Uniform 
Amendments, as well as by the Alabama Committee: 
§ 2A-532. LESSOR'S RIGHTS TO RESIDUAL INTEREST 
In addition to any other recovery permitted by this Article or 
other law, the lessor may recover from the lessee an amount that 
will fully compensate the lessor for any loss of or damage to the 
lessor's residual interest in the goods caused by the default of the 
lessee.269 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
This Article has endeavored to familiarize the Alabama com-
mercial bar with the current contours of personal property lease 
law in this state, and to acquaint the practitioner with the progress 
of the Alabama Article 2A Committee's deliberations. It has de-
scribed the sources of the status quo, and has suggested the need 
for comprehensive codification in this area of the commercial law. 
The authors hope that progress on this project will continue 
apace and culminate, in the not-too-distant future, in the type of 
coherent personal property lease law that will serve the interests of 
all Alabama constituencies. Further, by striking the appropriate 
balance between the needs of this state and the systemic goals of 
uniformity, enactment of an Alabama version of Article 2A will en-
hance the practice of commercial law in Alabama and thereby 
encourage national, as well as international, interests to enter into 
lease transactions governed by the new Alabama statute. 
269. U.C.C. § 2A-532 (1990); DRAFT ALA. CoDE§ 7-2A-532 (1990); CAL. CoM. CoDE ANN. 
§ 10532 (West 1990); see also CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 186, at 1045-46. 
